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GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CASH_ASSETS Ratio of liquidity, intended as cash plus cash equivalents, 
over the total assets 
CASH_ASSETS_w Winsorized CASH_ASSETS 
Cons Constant 
CRIMINAL Dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a firm is 
controlled by a mafia organization 
DebVShareholders Debts due to the shareholders 
DIA Direzione Investigativa Antimafia  
EBITDA Earnings before interests, taxes, amortizations and 
depreciations 
FATF Financial action task force 
INC_LABOUR Personnel cost over total revenues 
INC_LABOUR_w Winsorized INC_LABOUR 
LEVERAGE Total debts over total assets 
LEVERAGE_w Winsorized leverage 
ML Money laundering 
MLR Multivariate linear regression 
NETSALES Operating revenues from sales in the period  
NETSALES_w Winsorized netsales 
ROE Return on equity 
ROE_w Winsorized return on equity 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
SIZE_w Winsorized natural logarithm of total assets 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the world there are many places where three unfortunate circumstances coexist:1 
1) the lack of cooperation among the people inside, despite of the mutual benefits that such 
a behaviour would lead; 
2) the unfair competition, occurred through harmful ways; 
3) the refrainment from competing whenever the competition would lead to more desirable 
outcomes for the society as a whole. 
However, not many of those places have experienced that combination lasting for centuries: 
among the exceptions, it figures the Southern Italy, especially the regions of Campania, 
Calabria and Sicilia, where the phenomenon has a very long standing, in spite of the fact that 
Italy, considered as a whole, is actually one of the most industrialized Countries in the world. 
In this scenario the mafia organizations have played a very active role, representing the 
“quintessence of this structure, in which all the crucial behavioural patterns converge to form 
an indissoluble but explosive mixture”2.  
Today, however, the phenomenon is no more limited to these regions, but instead it is something 
that interests the whole territory, with no exceptions, and go even beyond the national borders, 
expanding like an oil spill. It affects the society at any level, from the social, political, judicial 
and economic one. 
It is of common knowledge that the criminal organizations are today operating not only in the 
illegal activities, where they maintain the monopolistic position in the commerce of drugs, the 
sexual exploitation, the illegal markets of weapons, counterfeiting, gambling, illegal wastes, 
tobaccos, usury and extorsions3; besides those activities, that generate the highest part of the 
proceeds,4 the mafia organizations have entered in the legal sphere of the economy, through the 
use of firms that, despite the legal appearance, serve to many functions the criminal organization 
that controls them.  
                                                          
1 Gambetta D. (2000), Mafia: The Price of Distrust’, in Gambetta, Diego (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, chapter 10, pp. 158-
175. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. Milano: 
Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it 
4 Ibid. 
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Therefore, it is noticed that, although the violence represents the main element of 
characterization of the mafia organizations5, during the last years its use has been decreasing, 
demonstrating how the so-called “metodo mafioso” is changing overtime. 
The violent actions undertaken during the XX century have been substituted by reciprocal 
relations and behaviours of collusion in both the legal and illegal markets. 
Moreover, there are “context factors” 6, thus political, social and economic conditions that 
favour the expansion and the reproduction of the mafia groups, in an inextricable scenario 
where the interests of the legal side of the society mix together with those of the mafia 
organizations.  
The scientific research has constantly increased its attention to this issue, not only under the 
sociological perspective, but also under the empirical one, collecting an increasing number of 
data from the financial statements of the criminal firms, with the aim to provide a framework 
for a better understanding of the key characteristics of these companies and try to understand 
how they operate in practice.  
However, how the criminal firms differ from the legal companies? Are there any elements that 
favour them in the competition in the market?  
This dissertation aims at answering to these questions by providing empirical evidence of the 
different characteristics that the criminal firms have with respect to the other companies, as well 
as the advantages that allow their proliferation across the whole Country. 
In the first chapter, after a brief description of the four main criminal organizations operating 
in Italy (‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, Cosa Nostra and Sacra Corona Unita), will be explained the 
investments made by these organizations in the legal economy, describing the peculiarities of 
the sectors involved and the instrument used by the same group to infiltrate there: the criminal 
firms.  
Then, it will be presented the different types of the criminal firms that have been identified by 
the various authors, such as Sciarrone, Fantò and Catanzaro, illustrating their differences and 
roles for the mafia organizations.  
                                                          
5 Arlacchi P., (2007), La Mafia Imprenditrice: dalla Calabria al Centro dell’Inferno, Il Saggiatore.  
Sciarrone R. (2009) Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, Donzelli Editore, Roma.  
Fantò E. (1999), L’impresa a partecipazione mafiosa: economia legale ed economia criminale, Dedalo editore. 
Gambetta D. (1988), Mafia: i costi della sfiducia, Einaudi, Torino. 
Dalla Chiesa N. (2016) Passaggio a nord. La colonizzazione mafiosa, Edizioni Gruppo Abele. 
6 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
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The first chapter ends reporting the studies performed on the relation between the presence of 
the mafia in a territory and the economic outputs, in order to pointing out the centrality of the 
theme on the actual debate: the mafia is extremely harmful for the territory, not only for the 
criminal implications related to its presence, but also for the distortions that it provokes on the 
basis of the economic, political and social system.  
Criminal organisations not only use the criminal firms to launder the proceeds of their illicit 
activities, but they also need to maintain their power and status; in the second chapter, therefore, 
it will be described the modus operandi of the mafia organizations and the reasons behind the 
use of the criminal firms to infiltrate in the legal economy; due to its central role, one paragraph 
will be dedicated to the explanation of the phenomenon of the money laundering, 
Then, it will be reported and described the three different competitive advantages that the 
criminal firms are expected to have with respect to the other non-criminal ones, according to 
the debate occurred among the various authors on the topic:   
1) the discouragement of the concurrence; 
2) the wage compression; 
3) the higher availability of financial resources. 
The third chapter is dedicated to the empirical analysis: firstly, the descriptive statistics of the 
sample of firms analysed will be presented, comparing, for each of the financial and economic 
data considered, the value observed for the criminal firms with that of the non-criminal ones; 
then, the same methodology will be applied to compare the characteristics of the criminal firms 
in the South with those of the Centre-North, to check the existence of significant differences 
among those economic agents. 
In addition, through the use of the multivariate linear regression, it will be tested the presence 
of the competitive advantages underlined in the second chapter to test the following hypothesis: 
1st HP - the criminal companies pay a lower wage to their workforce and lower social 
contributions with respect to the non-criminal firms; 
2nd HP - the criminal firms have higher financial resources, in terms of cash and cash 
equivalents, than the control group. 
The results obtained, although seem to not confirm the main hypothesis, offer interesting 
insights for a better understanding of the phenomenon and of the strategies implemented by the 
mafia organizations to infiltrate themselves in the legal sphere of the economy.  
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Chapter 1  
Mafia organizations in Italy 
 
1.1 Concept and origins of the Italian mafia 
 
The are many ways to define an organized crime group: among them, there is the one provided 
by the Office on Drugs and Crime of the United Nations, that, in the Art. 2 (a) of the “United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime And The Protocols Thereto” 
defines an organized criminal group as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing 
for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
or offences… in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.7 
Therefore, it is possible to summarize the characteristics that represent a common denominator 
of an organized crime group: 8 
▪ it shall be a structured organization made of people collaborating for a long period of 
time, often indefinite; 
▪ it shall be finalized to the enrichment, personal or of the organization or both; 
▪ it shall include the use of the corruption, or of the violence or the perpetration of crimes. 
In Italy the association between the concept of criminal organization and the one of mafia-type 
organization has been recognized only during the mid-1980s9; indeed, according to the social 
scientists carrying out the first field studies in Sicily between the 1960s and the early 1980s, the 
mafia was simply a form of behaviour and power.10  
However, contrary to what most scholars maintained up to the mid-1980s, the judicial inquiries 
carried out have proved that formalised mafia groups do exist, as Cosa Nostra in Sicily and the 
’Ndrangheta in Calabria and Camorra in Campania11, that will be discussed more deeply in the 
following paragraphs.  
                                                          
7 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime (2004), United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime And The Protocols Thereto, New York (US). 
8 Savona E. U., Criminalità organizzata 
http://www.jus.unitn.it/users/dinicola/criminologia/topics/materiale/dispensa_5_1.pdf. 
9 Paoli, L. (2004). Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises. Global Crime Today: 
The Changing Face of Organised Crime, 19-32 (2005).  
10 Ibid. 
11 Mazzenzana S. (2016) Il Maxiprocesso di Palermo, Osservatorio sulla criminalità organizzata Cross Vol.2 N°1. 
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In the same period, the Italian  legislation provided a first12 and a widely accepted definition of 
the mafia-type association: the Art. 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code introduced with the 
“Rognoni-La Torre law” of the 1982, indeed, identifies the fundamental elements of the mafia-
type association through the use of the same organization to exercise economic and political 
pressures on the society and their citizens, aiming at the obtainment of a unfair profit13.  
Therefore the law defines the mafia-type organization as an organized criminal group whose 
participants “take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting 
conditions of submission and silence to commit criminal offences, to manage or at all events 
control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public 
contracts and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for 
others”.14 
Although the mafia-type organization is a criminal organization, but the opposite is not always 
true, for the sake of this dissertation the terms “mafia-type organization” and “criminal 
organizations” will be used as synonyms.  
According to many researches, Italy is arguably the cradle of the first criminal organizations15. 
However, the reasons behind the origins and the developments of the phenomenon are not 
straightforward; to give an example, according to a study conceived by Acemoglu, De Feo and 
De Luca16 the born of the Sicilian mafia, in the end of the XIX century, can be attributable to 
the weak presence of the State in the territory and to the inability of the public institutions to 
give a valid response to the growing violent repressions ordered by the landlords of the large 
agricultural estates; the owners wanted to repress the socialist Fasci’s Movements that, 
representing the interests of the peasants, asked for better living conditions, higher wages and 
more rights after the exceptional draught of the 1893, who reduced them to beggary.    
                                                          
12 Bianchi Pietro A., Marra A., Masciandaro D., Pecchiari N., (2017), “Is It Worth Having the Sopranos on Board? 
Corporate Governance Pollution and Organized Crime: the Case of Italy”, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2017-59. 
13 Savona E. U., Criminalità organizzata 
http://www.jus.unitn.it/users/dinicola/criminologia/topics/materiale/dispensa_5_1.pdf. 
14 Legge 13 settembre 1982, n. 646 Disposizioni in materia di misure di prevenzione di carattere patrimoniale ed 
integrazioni alle leggi 27 dicembre 1956, n. 1423, 10 febbraio 1962, n. 57 e 31 maggio 1965, n. 575.). 
15 Paoli, L. (2004). Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises. Global Crime Today: 
The Changing Face of Organised Crime, 19-32 (2005).  
Bianchi Pietro A., Marra A., Masciandaro D., Pecchiari N., (2017), “Is It Worth Having the Sopranos on Board? 
Corporate Governance Pollution and Organized Crime: the Case of Italy”, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2017-59. 
16 D. Acemoglu, G. De Feo, G. De Luca, “Weak States: Causes And Consequences Of The Sicilian Mafia”, 
Working Paper 24115 http://www.nber.org/papers/w24115. 
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Another study, accomplished by Dimico, Isopi and Olsson17, has stated the hypothesis that the 
growth and consolidation of the mafia in Sicily is strongly associated with an exogenous shock 
in the demand for lemons during the XIX century, driven by James Lind’s discovery on the 
effective use of citrus fruits in curing scurvy. Provided that the Sicily had already a dominant 
position as international supplier of citrus fruits, the increase in demand resulted in a very large 
inflow of revenues to citrus-producers during the 1800s. However, due to the specific 
requirements needed to cultivate the citrus trees, just few producers obtained high profits. 
The combination of factors as the high profitability of the business, the weak enforcement of 
the law, the low level of interpersonal trust and a high level of local poverty made lemon 
producers a suitable target for predation. Moreover, the failures of both the Bourbon regime 
and of the newly formed government after Italian independence in 1861 to effectively enforce 
private property rights, led lemon producers to hire mafia affiliates for private protection and 
to play the role of intermediation with the retailers18. 
Although there is no a theory that excludes the others and despite of the numerousness of the 
variables to be considered for the analysis, there are some common factors that can help to 
understand the reasons behind the origins of the mafia phenomenon, such as:  
1. the weakness of the State and of the public institutions to enforce the existing legislation; 
while this was thought to be limited to the South of Italy, where effectively the 
phenomenon has moved its first steps, nowadays it is proved that even the Centre and 
the North of Italy have experienced the proliferation of the mafia-type organizations in 
their territories19. 
2. the presence of an economic interest behind both the origination and the development 
of the organization20: in the two studies described the mafia has been called for help by 
the richest landlords (Acemoglu, De Feo, De Luca, 2017) and by the most important 
producers of lemons (Dimico, Isopi, Olsson, 2017) to defend their interests against the 
threats coming from the poor peasants, in the former case, and the disadvantaged 
producers, in the latter case, that asked for a redistribution of the property rights; 
 
                                                          
17 Dimico A., Isopi A., Olsson O., (2017). Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons, Discussion 
Papers 12/01, University of Nottingham, CREDIT. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
20 Gambetta, D. (2000). Mafia: the price of distrust. D. Gambetta, Making and breaking cooperative relations, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 158-175. 
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1.2 The four Italian mafia organizations 
 
In Italy it is possible to identify the presence of different mafia-type organizations, both national 
but even international ones21. However, the attention here is focused on the four most important 
organizations, that are: 
I. ‘Ndrangheta, based in Calabria; 
II. Camorra, based in Campania; 
III. Cosa Nostra, based in Sicilia; 
IV. Sacra Corona Unita, based in Puglia. 
In the next sub-chapters will be briefly presented each of the four-criminal groups, with a higher 
attention and focus on the ‘Ndrangheta, because of its predominance in terms of infiltrations, 
affiliates, investments and activities that this group has with respect to the others.22 
 
1.2.1 ‘Ndrangheta 
 
The ’Ndrangheta is an organization originated in the high grounds of the Calabria region at the 
end of the XIX century. At its origins, the organization was known, only at the local level, for 
the numerousness of the violent episodes linked to the control of the territories of the provinces 
of Reggio Calabria and Catanzaro. This group, today, is one of the most powerful criminal 
organizations in the world, with ramifications and contacts from the US to the Australia, from 
the South of America to Japan. 23 
The mafia group in question presents an organizational structure more flexible, less centralized 
and hierarchical than the other criminal organizations, that leave more room to its individuals; 
moreover, the families inside the organization are more autonomous, even if, due to the familiar 
relationships that link to each other, the blood ties assume a central role.24  
The greater autonomy enables higher freedom of action, while the familiar linkages allow 
higher reliability, in terms of loyalty, from the members of the organization. Therefore, not 
                                                          
21 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
22 Direzione Nazionale Antimafia – Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore nazionale antimafia e 
dalla Direzione nazionale antimafia nonché sulle dinamiche e strategie della criminalità organizzata di tipo 
mafioso, anno 2014 (periodo 01/07/2013 – 30/06/2014). 
23 Gratteri N., Nicaso A., (2009), Fratelli di Sangue, Strade Blu. 
24 Sciarrone R. (1998), Il capitale sociale della mafia. Relazioni esterne e controllo del territorio, Quaderni di 
Sociologia, 18 | 1998, 51-72. 
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surprisingly the number of witnesses and collaborators coming from the ‘Ndrangheta is much 
lower than the one of others criminal organizations.25 
The figure 1.1 shows the structure of the ‘Ndrangheta, according to the revelations of the few 
collaborators, collected by the Public Prosecutor in Catanzaro, Nicola Gratteri26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – the structure of the Locale, sub-entities which the ‘Ndrangheta is divided into. 
 
The ‘Ndrangheta is divided into Locale, ‘Ndrina (or Cosca). The ‘Ndrina is based on a blood 
family: more ‘Ndrine form a Locale, the fundamental unit of mafia aggregation on a specific 
territory, that corresponds to a city or to one of its quartiers. To be considered a locale, the 
number of affiliates must be higher than 49. Each locale is directed by three individuals: the 
“capo-crimine”, the “contabile” and the “capo-bastone”, that is the boss of the locale.27 
Historically the ‘Ndrangheta was organized in “società maggiore” and “società minore” and 
today this division has remained unchanged. The difference is the amount of “doti” hold by the 
members, due to the fact that, while in the latter there are “picciotti semplici e di giornata” that 
inform the other affiliates on the news occurred in the territory, the most important affiliates of 
the locale are into the “società maggiore”, that decides the strategies to follow.28 
In Italy, the ‘Ndrangheta is the mafia with the highest number of references to organized crime 
infiltrations into legitimate businesses29, dislocated in Calabria, where the criminal group 
                                                          
25 Sciarrone R. (1998), Il capitale sociale della mafia. Relazioni esterne e controllo del territorio, Quaderni di 
Sociologia, 18 | 1998, 51-72. 
26 Gratteri N., Nicaso A., (2009), Fratelli di Sangue, Strade Blu. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
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controls the territory “systemically”30, but also in other regions, mainly in Lombardia and Lazio. 
The ‘Ndrangheta is present in almost all the sectors, both illegal and legal: among the latters, 
this criminal organization invest especially in the building and construction sector, in hotels, 
bars, restaurants, wholesale and retail trade. 31 
As shown in the figure below, the ‘Ndrangheta is present in almost all the regions of the Centre-
North of Italy, with very few exceptions.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 ‘Ndrangheta infiltrations 
 
 
 
1.2.2 Camorra 
 
The mafia-type organization known as Camorra comes from the Campania region.  
Its origination is not well defined, but many studies agree on the period between the XVI and 
the XVII century, before the Italian unification of the 1861.  
Differently from the other criminal organizations, the Camorra originates from the urban 
context, in the city of Napoli33 (while the other organizations have rural origins). 
The criminal organization is composed by a very high number of smaller groups that are created 
to develop minor criminal groups inside or after a scission of the pre-existent clans. Moreover, 
                                                          
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). 
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento.  
30 Gratteri N., Nicaso A., (2009), Fratelli di Sangue, Strade Blu. 
31 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali Similari, 
approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 1993, Doc. XXIII N.12, XI Legislatura. 
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it does not exist a structure hierarchically superior (with two exceptions during the 1970s-1980s, 
when two major groups were created, the “Nuova Camorra Organizzata” and the “Nuova 
Famiglia”, that resulted in a failure just a few years later), as it is for the other organizations, 
with the consequence of a high level of conflicts inside.34 
While the ‘Ndrangheta has been spread starting from the cells of calabresi who reproduced the 
model of the ‘Ndrine in the North of Italy and abroad, the Camorra have not exported its own 
organizational structure, but only criminal individuals for the running of the businesses, who 
allocated themselves in the most strategic places, independently from the immigration routes 
followed by the citizens of the Campania.35  
The Camorra operates in all the illegal and criminal activities and even in a consistent part of 
the informal and black economy, developed in the commercial activities more than the 
industrial or service ones, exploiting the use of the violence to discourage any form of 
concurrence as their first competitive advantage36.  
Therefore, looking at the investments of this criminal organization, it is possible to note the 
predominance of the wholesale and retail trade industry, hotels, bars and restaurants, with an 
important participation in the mining and construction sector. 37  
The figure 1.3 shows the regions where the degree of infiltrations of the Camorra is highest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 - Camorra infiltrations 
                                                          
34 Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali Similari, 
approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 1993, Doc. XXIII N.12, XI Legislatura. 
35 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
36 Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali Similari, 
approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 1993, Doc. XXIII N.12, XI Legislatura. 
37 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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1.2.3 Cosa Nostra 
 
Cosa Nostra is a mafia-type organization based in Sicilia.  
It was Tommaso Buscetta, in the 1984, to reveal to the judge Giovanni Falcone the name of the 
criminal organization with which the men of honour defined the group to which they belong. 
Cosa Nostra has some elements in common with the ‘Ndrangheta, as the pyramidal and 
hierarchical form of the organizational structure, the presence of formal rites of initiation and 
the central role of the family; however, on the contrary of the ‘Ndrangheta, the family is not 
linked by blood-ties, but it is governed by a representative elected by the group that controls a 
specific territory38. 
Starting from the 1950s the criminal organization has formed a superior hierarchical structure, 
the “Cupola”, in which are the bosses of the different groups operating across the Sicilia, 
highlighting the homogeneous presence in the entire island.39   
Today, Cosa Nostra is active in all the provinces of the Sicilia, its land of origins, and even in 
the North of Italy and worldwide, as shown by the evidences of infiltrations in the national 
territory, mainly in Lazio, Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia40, but even in the North and South 
America, where this criminal organization has historically established many relationships and 
conducted many affairs.41  
By looking at the sectors where Cosa Nostra is present the most, it is possible to note that, apart 
from the illegal activities managed, the organization is also present in the legal economy, with 
a predominance of infiltrations in the wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, energy supply, 
real estate activities, bars and restaurants.42 
The figure 1.4 summarizes the geographical presence of that mafia-type organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali Similari, 
approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 6 aprile 1993, Doc. XXIII N.2, XI Legislatura. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
41 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
42 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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Figure 1.4 Cosa Nostra infiltrations 
 
 
1.2.4 Sacra Corona Unita 
 
The last criminal group is the Sacra Corona Unita and is based in Puglia. It is called “Fourth 
Mafia”, because of the more recent origins and the lower power with respect to the other three 
criminal groups, although there is evidence about the increasing power of this mafia expressed 
by the number of infiltrations recorded in the last years.43 
The origins of this criminal group are due to the opposition of the local criminality to the 
invasion by the Camorra occurred during the 1970s, that aimed at conquering new territories to 
expand its activities, by excluding the local criminal families from the affairs whenever there 
were no profitable opportunities to make alliances with them.44 
The willingness to expand in that specific territory by the Camorra was explained by the 
strategic position of the region with respect the routes of trades with the Eastern Criminal 
organizations (i.e. Russian one over the others, but also the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese 
Triade, etc.). 45 
The historic activities performed were those linked to the food industries, considering the 
richness of the region in terms of oils, wines and other horticultural products, even though it is 
active even in the construction sector, wholesale, retail trade, bars and restaurants.46 
                                                          
43 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
44 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
45 Massari M. (1998) La Sacra Corona Unita: potere e segreto. Saggi tascabili Laterza 221. Roma: Laterza. 
46 Direzione Nazionale Antimafia – Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore nazionale antimafia e 
dalla Direzione nazionale antimafia nonché sulle dinamiche e strategie della criminalità organizzata di tipo 
mafioso, anno 2014 (periodo 01/07/2013 – 30/06/2014). 
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The figure 1.5 shows the infiltrations of the Sacra Corona Unita across the National territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 – Sacra Corona Unita infiltrations 
 
1.3 Investments of the mafia organizations and criminal firms 
 
As reported in the previous paragraphs, the mafia-type organizations, despite their origins in 
the Southern of Italy, have transplanted even in other parts of Italy and worldwide.   
The transplantation is favoured by the extremely high degree of flexibility and capacity of 
adaptation showed by the criminal organizations; in this scenario, the ‘Ndrangheta plays a role 
of leader, as demonstrated by the higher number of infiltrations made by this criminal group 
with respect to the others47. This organization, indeed, is particularly capable to exploit the 
possibilities of profits offered by the specific historical momentum or the specific geographical 
opportunities48, concluding affairs in almost all the economic sectors.  
There is no business immune from the infiltrations of the mafia, from the building to the 
tourism, from the retail to the restoration, from the gambling to the sport activities 49.  
The figure 1.6 summarizes the geographical expansions of the mafia-type organizations, 
according to the analysis performed in the 2013 by the Italian Ministry of Interior on the 
phenomenon of the infiltrations on the legal economy by the criminal organizations.  
                                                          
47 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
48 Smuraglia C., (1994) Relazione sulle Risultanze di Attività del Gruppo di Lavoro Incaricato di Svolgere 
Accertamenti su Insediamenti e Infiltrazioni di Soggetti ed Organizzazione di Tipo Mafioso in Aree Non 
tradizionali, Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Altre Associazioni 
Criminali Similari. 
49 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
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Figure 1.6 - Italian mafia infiltrations by locations50 
 
From the various relations of the Italian Antimafia Parliamentary Commission and the studies 
conducted by the Italian Ministry of Interior and the DIA it is possible to provide a list that 
summarizes the main results:  
• there are no regions immune from the phenomenon of the mafia infiltrations;  
• the characteristics of the industries where the presence of the mafia groups is highest 
share some common elements51, that are: 
- low technological level; 
- predominant use of manual and repetitive activities that do not require specific 
skills and competences; 
- high degree of deregulation; 
- relevant amount of public resources and funding; 
- low openness to the international market and concentration to a local area;  
• therefore, the sectors most interested by the mafia infiltrations that have the 
characteristic above listed are:   
1. the public works; 
2. the food industry; 
3. the large retail sector; 
4. restaurants, bars, hotels and tourism-related sectors; 
5. sheltered sectors (municipal waste removal and renewable energies); 
                                                          
50 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). 
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
51 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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• the investments are not made directly by the affiliates of the organizations, but they 
occur through the constitution of companies controlled directly or indirectly by the 
mafia organizations52, the so called criminal firms, whose predominant size is small and 
medium, and usually are established in the form of partnership and private liability 
company. 
Therefore, a criminal firm can be defined as a company attributable to a subject “mafioso” with 
an apparently legal objective, financed by illicit provenience capitals derived from the illegal 
activities managed by the organization. 53 
Moreover, it is possible to distinguish among two different types of criminal firms:54 
1. the criminal firms that are established or acquired by a criminal organization that 
manages it through its affiliates; 
2. the mafia infiltrated firms, in which the entrepreneur, despite its externality with the 
mafia organization, build with it stable relations. In this case the strategic choices are 
taken by the criminal organization and the firm loses its independence.  
As far as concerned the companies participated by the mafia organization, we can classify them 
according to the type of relation built between the mafia and the entrepreneur, distinguishing 
between55: 
a) subordinated entrepreneurs, that suffer passively the intimidation and the coercion of 
the mafia; 
b) colluded entrepreneurs, that instead acts rationally in the building of the relations with 
the mafia even through the personal linkages with the affiliates; 
c) instrumental entrepreneurs, an intermediate category between the other two, that look 
for an agreement timely limited and based on a contingent need. It is the case of 
                                                          
52 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
53 Gratteri N., (2013), Introduzione e Definizione dell’Impresa Mafiosa: Tipologie e Forme di Manifestazione, 
Lezione presso Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Corso di Economia della Legalità, Università di Reggio Calabria tenuta 
da Giuseppe Furciniti, Ten. Col. Guardia di Finanza. 
54 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34, XVII Legislatura. 
55 Sciarrone R. (2009) Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, Donzelli Editore. 
Gratteri N., (2013), Introduzione e Definizione dell’Impresa Mafiosa: Tipologie e Forme di Manifestazione, 
Lezione presso Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Corso di Economia della Legalità, Università di Reggio Calabria tenuta 
da Giuseppe Furciniti, Ten. Col. Guardia di Finanza. 
21 
 
companies operating mainly in the public work industry or in the large retail sectors, 
with larger dimension than the average of their competitors.56  
Both the colluded and the instrumental entrepreneurs ignore, or at least underestimate, the risks 
connected to the recourse of the mafia organization as a possible solutions to their problems; 
the liquidity crisis faced, the need of huge funds to finance their investments as well as the 
willingness to beat the competitors (especially in the public work sectors) are often the main 
reasons behind the decision to contact the local bosses and ask for a help. However, most of the 
times the firm is stripped or scaled by the mafia organization, and the entrepreneur loses the 
control on his activity57.  
The infiltration by the mafia organizations is carried out through a member of the criminal 
group or through a professional, a manager, lawyer, doctor, etc…that is affiliated with the 
criminal organization but that at the same time is beyond any suspect on the public opinion, 
thanks to its good reputation in the society58.  
The reasons behind the phenomenon of the infiltration of the mafia organizations in the legal 
economy are manifold; however, the scientific literature has identified five plausible 
motivations:59 
I) Money laundering: the mafia groups decide to invest in companies operating in 
many different businesses to conceal the streams of revenues coming from the illegal 
activities performed; when it is the case, the preferred sectors are those with a weak 
or changing regulation and territories with high incidence of tax evasion and black 
economy60, as the transportation and storage sector. 
II) Social consensus: the criminal organizations aim at obtaining social consensus 
among the population of the society where it is inserted. Therefore, the criminal 
                                                          
56 Gratteri N., (2013), Introduzione e Definizione dell’Impresa Mafiosa: Tipologie e Forme di Manifestazione, 
Lezione presso Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Corso di Economia della Legalità, Università di Reggio Calabria tenuta 
da Giuseppe Furciniti, Ten. Col. Guardia di Finanza. 
Catanzaro R. (1988), Il delitto come impresa. Storia sociale della mafia, Liviana Editrice, Padova. 
Fantò E. (1999), L’impresa a partecipazione mafiosa: economia legale ed economia criminale, Dedalo editore. 
Sciarrone R. (2009) Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, Donzelli Editore, Roma. 
57 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
58 Dalla Chiesa N. (2016) Passaggio a nord. La colonizzazione mafiosa, Edizioni Gruppo Abele. 
59 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
60 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). 
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
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firms often operate in sectors that reflects the territorial specificities and traditions, 
creating new jobs and promoting a positive image to the community, hiding their 
real criminal objectives61. This is especially true for the infiltrations achieved in 
Centre and North of Italy. 
III) Control of the territory: this is a distinctive feature of the Italian mafia-type 
organizations, both regarding the economic aspect and the symbolic component. 
Indeed, this function is fundamental to expand the control over the activities, both 
legal and illegal, performed in the territory and to create strategic networks with 
representatives of the local institutions, both economic and political ones. 
IV) Cultural and personal reasons: the criminal organizations may invest in a sector due 
to a specific willingness of the group, that can be disregarded by any economic 
reason62. 
 
In the table below, there is a brief summary of the business sectors mainly interested by the 
phenomenon of the mafia infiltrations: for each of them, are presented the different distinctive 
features.  
Table 1.7 - Business sectors, and related characteristics, where there are most criminal firms.63 
 
Another important aspect is that the infiltrations in the legal economy are not always performed 
by the four mafia organizations described in the previous paragraphs, especially in the North of 
                                                          
61 Sciarrone R. (2009) “Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove”, Donzelli Editore. 
62 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). 
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento.  
63 (Data taken from) Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses 
in Europe: A Pilot Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of 
the Infiltration of Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries 
(www.arielproject.eu). Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento.  
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the Country. As far as concerned the South area, the Italian mafia organizations control their 
territory of origination64: the Calabria is totally controlled by the ‘Ndrangheta, that maintains 
the monopoly of both the criminal and the legal activities; the same is true for the Sicilia and 
Campania, controlled respectively by Cosa Nostra and Camorra. 
In the central and northern regions, by the way, it is possible to identify the presence of foreign 
criminal organizations that establish their own criminal firms and act similarly to the national 
mafias65: the most active foreign organizations come from China, whose infiltrations are mainly 
in Lombardia, Veneto, Lazio and Toscana, but also from Russia, Albania, Nigeria and 
Georgia.66 
 
1.4 Consequences of the mafia presence on the territory 
 
This paragraph will report the main consequences that the presence of the mafia organizations 
has in the territory. 
Firstly, it is important to clarify that the mafia is harmful for the economy of the territory. 
This statement is confirmed by many studies, researches and statistics conducted on the areas 
where the presence of the mafia is stronger, as the Calabria, Campania and Sicilia.67  
In these regions it is possible to observe a dramatic worsening of the main economic indicators 
and the increase of the number of murders among the populations, especially after the spread 
of the new mafia capitalism, started during the ‘70s 68 and today still present.  
In the graph below it is represented the correlation between the presence of the mafia 
organization in a specific territory and the level of GDP per capita in the same areas. 
 
                                                          
64 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu). 
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.; Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, 
Anche Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
67 Tarantola A.M. (2012), Dimensione delle attività criminali, costi per l’economia, effetti della crisi economica, 
Testimonianza del Vice Direttore Generale della Banca d'Italia alla Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul 
fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali, anche straniere. 
Pinotti P., “The economic cost of organized crime: evidence from southern Italy”, Economic Working Papers, 868, 
April 2012, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area. 
Lopresto, D. F. (2015), Mafia, Institutions and GDP: An Econometric Estimation of the Effects of Organized Crime 
in Italy, City University of London, 120023417, EC3009 Project. 
68 Arlacchi P., (2007), La Mafia Imprenditrice: dalla Calabria al Centro dell’Inferno, Il Saggiatore. 
https://www.istat.it 
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Figure 1.8 - Relation between mafia-type organisations and GDP per capita across Italian regions, 
average over the period 1983-2007 69  
 
Bold triangles denote regions with a historical presence of mafia organizations, hollow triangles 
denote regions with a more recent presence while circles denote all other regions.  
To demonstrate that the relation highlighted is causal and thus to eliminate the problem related 
to the endogeneity, it has been used an instrumental variable: the number of cases of application 
of the Article 416-bis of the Italian Penal Code every 100,000 inhabitants, as reported by the 
police to the judiciary authority. In this way it has limited the possible concerns related to 
whether is the presence of the mafia to negatively impact the economic outcome or is the bad 
economic scenario that allows the mafia to proliferate. 
In the figure below, instead, it is shown the regional geographical distribution of the criminal 
organizations: this figure shows the strength of the link between the presence of a criminal 
organization and the economic scenario of the territory interested by the phenomenon70.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69 Data taken from: Pinotti P., “The economic cost of organized crime: evidence from southern Italy”, Economic 
Working Papers, 868, April 2012, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area. 
70 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.2 - Presence of mafia-type criminal organizations across Italian regions, average over the 
period 1983-2007 
 
The downside of that work however, is represented by the fact that the data on the number of 
crimes committed and judged through the application of the law in question are much lower 
than the real number of penal infringements: this is due by the widespread presence of secrecy 
and intimidation among the individuals, especially in societies where the number of crimes 
committed is the highest71; thus, these values underestimate the magnitude of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, the performed analysis confirms that hypothesis according to which the presence of 
the mafia negatively affects the level of GDP of the territory. 
In conclusion, the presence of the mafia organizations is harmful for the territory, not only in 
terms of GDP, but even in terms of private investments, that have decreased during the last 
decades in the South of Italy and replaced by higher public investments 72, less profitable than 
the formers.  
In addition, the last report of the Eurostat on the regional economies of the European Union has 
shown a very dramatic scenario for the South of Italy, whose level of GDP, labour productivity, 
capital productivity and rate of unemployment are similar to the poorest regions of the Eastern 
Europe and far from the situation of the richest Countries, North of Italy included73. 
Although there are many factors that have an impact on these poor conditions, the presence of 
the mafia organization has contributed a lot to the worsening of the performances. 
 
 
                                                          
71 Pinotti P., “The economic cost of organized crime: evidence from southern Italy”, Economic Working Papers, 
868, April 2012, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area. 
72 Ibid. 
73 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 
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Chapter 2  
Roles and advantages of criminal firms 
 
2.1 The phenomenon of the money laundering  
 
In the previous chapter it has been referred to the money laundering as one of the reasons behind 
the infiltration of the mafia organizations in the legal economy.  
In order to better understand the phenomenon, it is useful to define it. The EU Directive 
849/2015/EC in the Article 1, defines the money laundering (ML) as:  
“(a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal 
activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequences of that person’s action;  
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, 
rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is derived from 
criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an activity;  
(c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such 
property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an activity;  
(d) participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating 
and counselling the commission of any of the actions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c).”74 
The phenomenon of the ML is structured into three different parts: 
a) Introduction of the resources on the market (placement): the proceeds of the illicit 
activities are collected and placed to financial intermediaries and other institutions, or 
directly to the market through the purchasing of goods, through figureheads; this step is 
fundamental to get rid of cash and banknotes derived from the illegal retail trades; 
b)  Layering: it is the phase of laundering of the capitals through financial transactions 
aimed at impeding the investigation proceedings of the cash flows; 
c) Integration: the resources “laundered” are invested in the legal economy, often through 
provisions of services by high-skilled professionals, as consultants, financial 
intermediaries, notaries, etc.  
                                                          
74 EC. Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015, Pub. L. No. 849, 
Official Journal of the European Union (2015). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849. 
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From the definition, it is possible to identify six risk factors of money laundering:75 
I) organized crime infiltrations; 
II) illegal markets; 
III) tax evasion and underground economy; 
IV) cash-intensiveness;  
V) opacity of business ownership; 
VI) money transfer. 
Savona E.U., Riccardi M. Milani and others (2017) have combined all these elements to obtain 
a composite indicator of the risk of money laundering in Italy and in other EU Countries: the 
figure below consider the risk of ML in Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Money laundering risk across Italy 76 
 
By looking at the results it is possible to observe that the risk of money laundering is relatively 
high in all the Italian regions, especially in the South, where the risk is the highest; however, 
even in the Centre-North the analysis shows the presence of areas (i.e. Prato and Imperia above 
the others) in which the risk of ML is very high, demonstrating how the problem is not restricted 
to a specific geographic area, but interests the Country as a whole.  
 
 
                                                          
75 Savona E. U., Riccardi M., (eds), (2017), Assessing the risk of money laundering in Europe. Final Report of 
Project IARM (www.transcrime.it/iarm). Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
76 Data taken from: Savona E. U., Riccardi M., (eds), (2017), Assessing the risk of money laundering in Europe. 
Final Report of Project IARM (www.transcrime.it/iarm). Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro 
Cuore. 
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Although the phenomenon of the ML does not depend solely by the infiltrations of the mafia 
organizations, that factor is the preponderant one77; moreover, by comparing the distribution of 
the risk of money laundering across the Country with the map showing the presence of the 
mafia organizations by regions78 it is notable how the two phenomena interest the territories 
with similar intensity, confirming the ML as the preferred modus operandi used by the criminal 
organizations to infiltrate themselves in the legal side of the economy. 
However, there are many different types through which the criminal organizations move money 
for the purpose of disguising its origins and re-investing it into the legal economy. The 
following non-exhaustive list includes the most frequently used: 79 
1. bulk cash smuggling: it refers to the large amounts of liquid cash that the criminal 
organizations accumulate, as a result of various types of criminal activities, and then 
physically transport from one Country to another, subtracting from controls by the 
public authorities; 
2. trade-based money laundering: it is a process to disguise the proceeds of criminal 
activities and to move value through the use of trade transactions, in order to legitimise 
their illicit origin. In practice, this can be achieved through the misrepresentation of the 
price, quantity or quality of the goods object of the transaction. The techniques of trade-
based money laundering include: 
a. alternations of the number of invoices relative to goods and services; 
b. multiple invoicing of goods and services; 
c. alterations of the number of shipments of goods and services; 
d. falsification of the quantities and qualities of the goods and services traded; 
3. movement of resources through the financial system, with the use of cheques and wire 
transfers or other fictitious transactions; 
4. constitution of front business, thus highly cash-intensive activities as bars, restaurants, 
laundries, where the greatest part of the revenues are generated in the form of cash and 
where it is easier to mix the legal with the illegal proceeds.   
Such companies, especially bars and restaurants, represent even a strategic place of 
                                                          
77 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
78 Pinotti P., “The economic cost of organized crime: evidence from southern Italy”, Economic Working Papers, 
868, April 2012, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area. 
79 Financial Action Task Force (2006), Trade Based Money Laundering, Paris N.1.   
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meetings, important operative headquarters and also weapon stocks, channels through 
which the criminal organizations exercise the control of the territory.80    
 
2.2 Mafia infiltrations and modus operandi  
  
As explained in the chapter one, although the mafia organizations have their origins in the 
Southern of Italy, the reported cases of infiltrations are spread in the whole Country with no 
exceptions.  
As far as concerned the period in which the mafia has started the transplantation to the North, 
Dalla Chiesa had reported the mid-1950s as reference period81, while Varese has documented 
a revelation made by Antonino Calderone, ex-boss and collaborator of justice, according to 
whom two clans of Cosa Nostra were present in Piemonte at the end of the II world war.82  
In any case, how that expansion has originated and the reasons behind are still an open debate 
on the scientific literature. 
Among the authors it is possible to identify a first theory, defined as the “Contagion Theory” 
that accepts a configuration in which the Centre and the North of Italy suffered passively a sort 
of contagion by the criminal organizations of the South, without any active contribution, that 
can be attributed to: 
▪ the forced resettlement of the 1957, through which the public legislation decided to 
punish the individuals judged for their affiliation to a mafia organization by keeping 
them away from their origins, with the belief that, once far from home, they could have 
been influenced by the sane society of the North83; 
▪ the phenomenon of the migration that occurred in concomitance with the economic 
boom between the ’50s and the ‘60s, that led many families from the South to the 
regions where the industrialization was improving the living conditions of the society;   
However, as previously reported, the infiltrations and the establishments had occurred even 
before the resettlement period: therefore, although it is accepted the contribution of that law to 
                                                          
80 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, Anche 
Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
81 Dalla Chiesa N. (2016) Passaggio a nord. La colonizzazione mafiosa, Edizioni Gruppo Abele., p.43. 
82 Varese F., (2006), How Mafias Migrate: The Case of ‘Ndrangheta in Northern Italy, Law & Society Review 
Vol. 40, N. 2, June, 2006, pp. 411-444. 
83 Dalla Chiesa N. “Passaggio a nord: la colonizzazione mafiosa”, 2016, Edizione Gruppo Abele, p.37 
Sciarrone R. “Mafie del Nord: Strategie criminali e contesti locali”, 2014, Donzelli Editore. 
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the increase of the phenomenon, it needs to be seen as one of the causes, not the only 
explanation84.  
The other approach presented in the scientific literature and supported in this dissertation starts 
from the consideration of the role played by societies infiltrated. 
The mafia has decided to move to the North because of the existence of factors that made this 
choice profitable and increased the probability to succeed in the transplantation, not just because 
of an “accident of history” as theorized by Varese85, thus the societies interested played an 
active role in that success. 
The presence of the mafia organizations in the non-traditional areas can be explained by many 
different factors:86    
▪ vulnerability and permeability of the referent context, in terms of administrative opacity 
and presence of sectors characterized by a low technological-intensiveness and scarce 
degree of qualified workforce needed that, as explained in the previous chapter, are 
easier to get infiltrated by the criminal organizations and where the phenomenon of the 
ML is more difficult to capture87; 
▪ accessibility, reciprocity, complicity and willingness to cooperate with the criminal 
organizations88, fundamental for the creation of a baseline of common interests between 
the entrepreneurship and the mafia. The formers do not always commit crimes, but 
operate in an economic context that, instead of following the rules of the market 
economy, it is controlled and regulated by the criminal organizations.89 
▪ attitudes of the authorities and institutions of the North of Italy characterized by an 
underestimation of the risks of infiltrations and refusal to recognize the permeability of 
the territories to the proliferation of the mafia organizations, both at political and judicial 
level90: one of the most representative example regards the police operation “Maglio 3”, 
in which the Judgements expressed by both the Courts of First and Second Instance 
                                                          
84 Dalla Chiesa N. “Passaggio a nord: la colonizzazione mafiosa”, 2016, Edizione Gruppo Abele p. 36. 
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87 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
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Roma. 
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acquitted the mafia infiltrates operating in Liguria denying the possibility that the case 
could be attributed to the presence of the ‘Ndrangheta in loco.91 
However, the constant enlargement of the scope of action of the mafia organizations in non-
traditional areas is just one dimension used to describe the modus operandi in the recent years: 
the other distinctive elements that constitute the key success factors can be listed as follow: 
a) more flexible organizational structures, often of reticular-type shape, composed by 
many units located in territories much far away from the origins92 but with their own 
decision-making autonomy. The Italian Anti-mafia Parliamentary Commission has 
referred to the phenomenon as a “liquid mafia”93 to indicate the pervasive presence in 
the territories shown especially by the ‘Ndrangheta, whose characteristics best fit with 
this definition. 
The fluidity of the mafia groups has lead the organizations to decrease the actions of 
violence and to undertake characteristics of entrepreneurship, that have implied higher 
benefits and advantages, mainly of economic-type; 
b) the development of the entrepreneurial culture in the legal economy, that allows the 
mafia to enter in many legal sectors, as the building and construction, the wholesale and 
retail commerce, the tourism, the gambling activities as well the renewable energies and 
the waste management, besides the public works and the public health.94    
Nonetheless, the key success factors are not derived by the managerial skills developed 
by the bosses of the organizations, but the possibility to cooperate and rely on the 
support of third colluded subjects, in agreement with the mafia, as entrepreneurs and 
professionals that operate in the opacities of the financial system, allowing the mafia to 
profit more and to launder the capitals obtained from the illegal activities managed; 95   
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c) the last part relates to the existence of the so-called “grey area” 96, intended as the room 
between the legal (white) and the illegal (black) parts of the economy, where the mafia 
affiliates build a network of relations with the exponents of the legal economy, members 
of the economic, judicial and political sphere, offering the services that the mafia usually 
provides, mainly those of protection and intermediation 97.   
Therefore, year by year the mafia has adapted to the continuous transformations occurred at the 
social, political and economic level.  
Especially the ‘Ndrangheta, it has succeeded to transplant its modus operandi everywhere. The 
element of novelty is represented by the infiltration in the legal economy, with all the 
consequences and modalities described. In this framework, the criminal firms can be seen as 
instrumental to the implementation of the strategies decided by the bosses.  
Nevertheless, what is important to pointing out is that the criminal firm is not consequent to a 
higher demand or offer of goods or services otherwise provided in the legal economy: it has 
established for a precise scope, that can wide from the money laundering, to the willingness of 
grab a public procurement for the realizations of public works98 or for the other reasons 
previously listed; the common element is the lack of any entrepreneurial form of risk in the 
“genetic code”99 inside the criminal character of this firm. 
The following paragraph will be dedicated to the clarification and the description of the main 
competitive advantages, as well as to summarize what are the different views proposed and 
discussed in the scientific literature. 
 
2.3 Competitive advantages of the criminal firms 
 
Although there is a general agreement on the existence of competitive advantages exploited by 
the criminal firms, it is not straightforward to provide an exhaustive list, due to the complexity 
of the phenomenon and the fact that the studies on the infiltrations of the mafia in the legal 
economy are quite recent.100  
                                                          
96 Ibid; 
97 Dalla Chiesa N. “Passaggio a nord: la colonizzazione mafiosa”, 2016, Edizione Gruppo Abele p. 102. 
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100 Commissione Parlamentare Di Inchiesta Sul Fenomeno Delle Mafie E Sulle Altre Associazioni Criminali, 
Anche Straniere, Approvata dalla Commissione nella seduta del 21 dicembre 2017, Doc. XXIII N. 34. 
34 
 
However, for the sake of this dissertation, three main competitive advantages will be considered 
and discussed: 
I) the discouragement of the free market concurrence; 
II) the wage compression; 
III) the availability of financial resources. 
 
2.3.1 The discouragement of the market concurrence 
 
The first competitive advantage consists on the ability of the mafia organizations to create the 
conditions for the creation of a sort of monopoly in the market of reference.   
In the last decades this occurred in a violent form, through physical intimidations, threats and 
kidnapping of the competitors. 101  
The sectors firstly involved by this phenomenon were the building and construction, the 
transportation, the retail commerce and touristic activities, as well as the public works.  An 
example in this regard is provided by the judge Falcone who, in the 1982 described the 
economic situation of Palermo as a context in which the mafia had the full control on the whole 
building sector, from the caves to the production of the concrete, etc…, obtained through the 
threats perpetrated to the legal firms that operated there. 102  
Moreover, he reported that, during the 1980s, it has been verified many substitutions of 
managers of companies operating in the building sector to the advantage of affiliates of criminal 
organizations103. 
In more recent periods, when the main affairs moved toward the Centre and North of Italy, the 
mafia organizations changed their strategy and modus operandi, as previously explained, but, 
although the recourse to the violence has decreased, it has not disappeared yet, with cases of 
intimidation, extortions and threats still present in the local newspapers. 
The first author who theorized the use of the violence as the key factor to discourage the 
concurrence was Arlacchi104 , then shared and furtherly broadened by other authors, as 
Catanzaro, who laid the emphasis on the centrality of the violence to control the market and to 
                                                          
101 Arlacchi P., (2007), La Mafia Imprenditrice: dalla Calabria al Centro dell’Inferno, Il Saggiatore. 
102 During the 1970s-1980s the public investments pro-capita made in the South of Italy were much higher than 
the ones made in the rest of the Country: Franco Chiarello, Opere grandi e grandi opere. Opere pubbliche e di 
pubblica utilità, Quaderni di Sociologia, 16 | 1998, 96-103. 
103 Arlacchi P., (2007), La Mafia Imprenditrice: dalla Calabria al Centro dell’Inferno, Il Saggiatore p.105. 
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increase the power on the territory controlled 105; moreover, Catanzaro has theorized a first 
distinction of the criminal firms considering two dimensions: the unlawfulness of the objectives 
and the methods applied to operate in the market 106: in this view it is possible to distinguish 
between: 
▪ firms that make illicit activities and discourage the concurrence through the violence; 
▪ firms whose objectives are licit but use violent forms of discouragement of the 
concurrence; 
▪ firms that have illicit objectives and do not alter the market concurrence; 
▪ firms that have licit objectives and respect the concurrence existing in the market. 
Apart from the last one, all the other companies can be ascribed as criminal firms, due to their 
use of violence. 
In addition, the author considers the category of the “screen firms” 107 as the one used only for 
the purposes of the money laundering and not for any productive activity. 
The distinction between the “screen firms” and the other criminal firms has been used for the 
first time by Costantino (Costantino, 1986) according to whom the “mafia capital firms” 108 are 
those that operate in the legal market by respecting the rules of the free market concurrence, 
even if are financed by illicit capitals. Therefore, the author, although considers as separated 
the violence from the intimidation, does not confirm that the criminal firms use the former as 
predominant way to impose themselves in the market. 
The position of Catanzaro has been partly criticized by Fantò109, according to whom it is not 
always possible to identify the conditions listed by the former to classify a criminal firm. As 
matter of facts, he proposes a definition of criminal company as an economic unit whose 
advantage comes from the capitals derived from criminal and illegal activities, aimed at 
producing or exchanging licit goods and services in the official markets through formally legal 
ways; in any case, the competitive advantage is constituted by the intimidation exercised by the 
mafia organization that controls it, independently of the entrepreneur that formally sit there.110  
                                                          
105 Catanzaro R. (1984) La mafia come fenomeno di ibridazione sociale, Italia contemporanea, p. 33. 
106 Catanzaro R. (1988), Il delitto come impresa. Storia sociale della mafia, Liviana Editrice, Padova, p.251. 
107 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, he agrees with Catanzaro concerning the violent form used to conduct the business 
as one of the fundamental elements of discrimination between the criminal firms and the non-
criminal ones111; moreover, he argued that the first criminal firms, those operating in the South 
of Italy during the 1970s, had not yet the possess of the huge amount of financial resources as 
theorized by Arlacchi, but succeeded in the legal activities undertaken mainly through the 
violence used with respect to the other firms, with the aim to remain the only participant in the 
market.112 
In more recent times the scientific literature, whilst maintaining the main position on the 
discouragement of the concurrence, does refer to the abandonment of the violence, or at least 
to its drastic decrease113; this is confirmed by the Anti-mafia Parliamentary Commission, that 
report how the lower number of homicides and violent actions undertaken in the North are part 
of the willingness to adequate to the world of the affairs, where the permanent use of the 
violence is anti-economic by definition.114  
However, the phenomenon of the discouragement of the concurrence does not imply necessary 
a higher level of efficiency and profitability. Many times, indeed, the mafia organizations use 
the criminal firms to launder the proceeds from the illegal activities performed, without 
pursuing an additional economic return from the legal side of the economy; the type of firms 
mainly used by the criminal organizations are characterized by a low technological level and 
high-intensity of manual workforce, as well as low openness to the foreign market. 
In the lights on the considerations reported, and due to the type of data collected for the sake of 
this dissertation, it is not possible to test the existence of this competitive advantage exploited 
by the criminal firms, because the economic and financial information reported in the financial 
statements are quantitative-type, and they do not include qualitative elements necessary to test 
the use of the violence and of the intimidation.   .   
 
2.3.2 The wage compression  
 
The second competitive advantage of the criminal organizations in a specific economic sector 
is the compression of the wages paid to the employees. 
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The wage compression is usually implemented by way of tax evasion for the social and security 
contributions and the no payment of overtime115, other than the tendency to discourage any 
form of protest of the employees, that many times are forced to operate under unsecured and 
unstable conditions.116  
Another relevant element is the progressive decrease of the trade union associations, that 
becomes irrelevant when the decisions are not concorded between the two parties but are 
imposed by the bosses. In addition, many times the workforce used does not result at all in the 
public registers, thus in the income statement, in these cases, there is no evidence of that cost117 
incurred. 
This interpretation is largely shared among the scientific literature: Arlacchi reported the 
diffusion of that phenomenon to the 1970s, providing the theory with many examples referred 
to the Calabria and Sicilia situations, highlighting how the phenomenon was particularly 
relevant for the economy of the territory due to its pervasiveness118.  
The wage compression, according to Fantò, can be even reconducted as an instrument used by 
the mafia organizations to obtain the control of the territory, especially in the past decades and 
mostly in the South: in this way, indeed, the entrepreneurs could offer a job to personnel that 
otherwise would have been unemployed.119  
Concerning the employment of undeclared workers by the criminal firms, the literature provides 
a distinction between the different reasons that push the workers to accept an undeclared 
position:120 
▪ escaping from the poverty: from a supply side perspective, the employment, albeit 
undecleared, avoids conditions of extreme poverty and provides the main source of 
income. This type is common within populations that are restricted from entering the 
labour market through regular employment, due to the macroeconomic context or due 
to the difficult economic conditions.  
On the demand side, the firms have an incentive to choose that workforce due to the 
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possibility to implement a cost-saving strategy for tasks that require relatively low skills 
and high level of repetitiveness; 
▪ the second type is called the “moonlight”121 which covers mainly qualified craftsmen 
who are not registered as self-employed and so can be used for their professional skills; 
▪ the third group include the solidarity-orientated workers, employed because of a mutual 
support within social networks, more than the monetary gain, whenever the firms face 
conditions of crisis and lack of resources to pay the personnel.  
The preferred group by the mafia organizations is the first one, and the empirical evidence 
shows that, in the Southern of Italy, that is often the case, considering the structural weakness 
of the economy and of the labour market.122 
According to Santino, the management of the workforce, together with the recourse to the 
violence and to the corruption, are the elements through which is possible to distinguish the 
criminal firms from the non-criminal ones123; therefore, the management of a criminal firm, as 
well as the payment of wages under the table, represent a possibility to launder the proceeds 
coming from the illegal activities without any suspect, guaranteeing a legitimation from the 
society for the jobs offered. 
However, in the last years the wage compression has been revised by recent researches 
conducted both at European and Italian level124: in detail, they have identified cases in which 
the affiliates of the mafia organizations were employed by the criminal firms and paid with 
extremely high salaries and benefits, with two main advantages: on one side, the exercise of the 
money laundering of the illegal proceeds; on the other side, the retribution of the members 
affiliated for their work and their contributions.   
In the light of these considerations, the main hypothesis to be tested is whether or not, in the 
sample of criminal firms collected, the phenomenon of the wage compression occurs. 
The analysis will be performed to observe whether the incidence of the cost of labour, incurred 
by the criminal firms, on the total revenues, is lower than the same ratio measured for the non-
criminal firms, as it would be logical to expect by reading the theories reported. 
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The value observed is not the absolute cost of personnel, due to the fact that it could be 
influenced by many factors whose data are not available, as the number of employees or their 
level of specialization; instead it will be used the labour-to-revenue ratio, a financial analysis 
tool that compares the amount of money a company spends on its employees to the amount of 
money it makes as revenues.  
 
2.3.3 The availability of financial resources 
 
The third advantage of the criminal firms is represented by the higher availability of financial 
resources that these entities hold with respect to non-criminal ones. 
According to Arlacchi, the criminal entrepreneurs have the possibility to invest more in the 
market thanks to the higher resources coming from the management of the illegal activities and 
by other criminal actions undertaken in the territory125. 
However, the mafia organizations have not always had the huge financial resources as estimated 
nowadays 126. One of the ways through which the mafia organizations, especially during the 
1970s, accumulated financial resources was the phenomenon of the kidnappings of parents and 
relatives of rich entrepreneurs and professionals in the North of Italy; one of the most relevant 
case was the kidnapping of John Paul Getty III, son of the rich oil manager John Paul Getty II, 
from which the ‘Ndrangheta asked a redemption of 1 bln of lire127, used to acquire the trucks 
necessary for the monopoly of the works started for the construction of the industrial port of 
Gioia Tauro, in the province of Reggio Calabria, among other things128.   
Fantò focuses on the phenomenon of the money laundering, extremely important for the 
concealment of the capitals obtained from the illegal activities, by identifying it as one of the 
key element of identification and advantage of the criminal companies, that succeed to gather 
more financial resources and to avoid problems of liquidity:129 legal and illegal activities are 
therefore closely intertwined within criminal firms as the legal activities mostly serve to launder 
profits stemming from illegal ones.  
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Some years before, it was Sciarrone that referred to the twofold use of the criminal firms by the 
mafia organization as instrumental to the money laundering (“screen firms” 130, as previously 
reported) as well as a way to control the territory and its economic activities, highlighting the 
centrality of the huge availability of financial resources in achieving these goals.  
Moreover, the higher availability of the financial resources has the consequence to allow the 
criminal firms to reduce the recourse of the indebtedness, due to the possibility to invest in the 
firms through equity. Indeed, the recent analysis performed by the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior has been shown that the criminal firms, on average, are financed mostly by equity131. 
In addition, the higher availability of financial resources is used even to fuel the phenomenon 
of the usury, especially in the last years subsequent the crisis occurred in the 2008, when the 
recourse to the financing from financial institutions has become more difficult to achieve for 
the legal firms. In these conditions, the lawful entrepreneurs have more often decided to recur 
to the mafia organizations to solve the lack of liquidity, although the interests asked is much 
higher than the ones asked in the market, feeding the phenomenon of the so-called “credito 
mafioso”.132 
However, this dynamic, examined by Sciarrone more than 10 years before the financial crisis 
of the 2008, proves that this feature is not contingent to the economic situation, although the 
crisis has increased the number of cases observed133. 
Nevertheless, more recent studies, conducted to empirically prove the existence of this 
advantage, have not confirmed the higher availability of cash by the criminal firms: among 
them, a recent study (Bianchi, Marra, Masciandaro and Pecchiari, 2017) has empirically shown 
that the economic consequences of the presence of the organized crime on private firms are 
both a lower level of profitability and a lower level of cash holdings, providing the explanation 
according to which the criminal firms are used by the mafia organizations mainly for money 
laundering purposes; moreover, the low level of cash is useful to reduce the risk of detection.134  
Although the study on the level of profitability and cash availability is statistically significant, 
it has been conducted on firms operating solely in the province of Milano; therefore, it is 
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interesting to reperform the analysis with a sample of firms collected all across the Country, 
both in the North and in the South, to see whether the phenomenon observed is limited just to 
one single region or otherwise is widespread across the Country. 
In the lights of the considerations made, the hypothesis that this dissertation proposes to verify 
is whether, in the sample of firms considered, there is evidence of a higher level of financial 
resources on the total assets reported in the balance sheet of the criminal companies with respect 
to the liquidity held by the non-criminal ones.  
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Chapter 3  
Analysis of the characteristics of the 
criminal firms 
 
3.1 Framework for the analysis 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the theoretical concepts illustrated in the previous 
paragraphs and to provide an analytical framework useful for the analysis of the characteristics 
of the criminal firms. 
Therefore, the work will be oriented to analyse and test whether the companies that have been 
processed due to their affiliation with a mafia-type organization: 135 
A) pay a lower cost of personnel with respect to the non-criminal firms, in relation to the 
amount of operating turnover realized; the cost of the labour considered includes both 
the remuneration due to the workers in terms of salaries and other benefits, the social 
security contributions due to the public authorities and the severance costs charged to 
the income statement (i.e. the line B-9 of the income statement under the Italian GAAP); 
B) possess or not a higher availability of financial resources, in terms of cash and cash 
equivalents, with respect to the non-criminal firms (i.e. the line C- III and C – IV of the 
balance sheet under the Italian GAAP). 
 
3.2 Outline of the analysis 
 
The analysis takes into consideration a number of firms that have at least one director connected 
with a mafia-type organization, who sit on board of the firm, or represents the relevant 
shareholder of the company.  
For the sake of this dissertation, a criminal firm is defined as such if: 
- it has been seized or confiscated by the Italian authorities due to its connections with a 
mafia-type organization; 
- a person arrested and condemned due to mafia-type crimes committed is one of the 
board member of the company; 
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- a person arrested and condemned due to mafia-type crimes committed is a shareholder 
and own at least the 10% of the shareholders capital136.   
The identification of the criminal firms connected with the criminal organizations is disciplined 
by the Art. 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code, the so-called “Legge Rognoni – La Torre”, that 
explicitly rule the crimes linked to the mafia. 
According to this Article, the Mafia-type organizations are those groups whose “participants 
take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting conditions of 
submission and silence to commit criminal offences, to manage or at all events control, either 
directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public contracts and 
services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for others”.137 
This dissertation represents a continuation of the work on the collection of data of the criminal 
firms operating in Italy initiated by Alberti138, who used information relative to processes active 
on the Court of Milan for the years 2000-2015 in order to study the possible law enforcement 
activities against the mafia’s infiltrations in the economy of the North of Italy.  
Part of the database used for the analysis is the result of the work made by researchers of the 
University of Padova who have collected data on police investigations occurred in the Centre-
North of Italy in a period between the years 2005 and 2014139.  
This dataset has been integrated with further observations from investigations occurred in the 
Southern of Italy, especially in the Calabria region, where the degree of mafia infiltration is the 
highest of Italy140. Although the investigation occurred in Calabria, the criminal firms identified 
are based in almost all the Italian regions, highlighting the high degree of infiltration of the 
‘Ndrangheta, the mafia-type organization which the investigations mainly refer to141. 
 
 
                                                          
136 Parbonetti A., Fabrizi M., Malaspina P., (2017), Caratteristiche e Modalità di Gestione delle Aziende Criminali, 
Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla Criminalità Organizza, Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata dell'Università 
degli Studi di Milano, Cross Vol.3 N°1. 
137 Legge 13 settembre 1982, n.646 Disposizioni in materia di prevenzione di carattere patrimoniale ed 
integrazione alle leggi 27 dicembre 1956, n.1423, 10 febbraio 1962, n.57 e 31 maggio 1965, n. 575.  
138 Alberti A., (2016), L’espansione della Criminalità Organizzata nell’Attività di Impresa al Nord: Economia 
Lecita e Criminalità Organizzata a Milano dal 2000 al 2015, Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata, Vol. 2, 
N.4. 
139 Parbonetti A., Fabrizi M., Malaspina P., (2017), Caratteristiche e Modalità di Gestione delle Aziende Criminali, 
Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla Criminalità Organizza, Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata dell'Università 
degli Studi di Milano, Cross Vol.3 N°1. 
140 Gratteri N., Nicaso A., (2009), Fratelli di Sangue, Strade Blu. 
141 Ibid. 
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The steps followed by the study of the University of Padova are: 
- identification of the investigations through the reports of the Italian Antimafia 
Parliamentary Commission, websites and newspapers; 
- elimination of the operations for which the judicial sentences (of first instance) were not 
available yet; 
- obtainment of the personal data of the arrested individuals, the company name and the 
address of the legal establishment of the seized companies from the official documents 
related to the ordinances of precautionary detention; 
- elimination of the individuals judged as innocents whose firm has been released; 
- verification of the infiltrations by the individuals on legal firms, by using the database 
“Telemaco” of the Italian Chambers of Commerce.142 
The analysis has been performed on 728 firms, observed for a period of years that range from 
the 2005 to the 2015 (for the South, the analysis does not consider the years 2005 and 2006 
because of the unavailability of the data), for a number of observations equal to 2,865.  
The criminal firms have been considered as such if: 
- have been constituted by the mafia-type organization to serve its illegal activities and to 
pursue its illegal objectives; in there, there are members of the organization who 
compare as shareholders or as directors; 
- have been infiltrated, wholly or in part, by a mafia-type organization through the 
acquisition of shares (or quotes) by the infiltrates or through the nomination of members 
of the criminal group as managers.143 
The analysis of the financial statements has been conducted on the data collected on the criminal 
companies both via “Telemaco”, “AIDA”, a data provider that contains the financial statements 
of Italian firms established as “Società a responsabilità Limitata” (i.e. S.r.l.), “Società per 
Azioni” (i.e. S.p.A.) and “Società in Accomandita per Azioni” (i.e. S.a.p.A.) and 
“AMADEUS”, a database that contains data of the financial statements of European Companies 
with a turnover of at least € 10.0 M.  
 
                                                          
142 Parbonetti A., Fabrizi M., Malaspina P., (2017), Caratteristiche e Modalità di Gestione delle Aziende Criminali, 
Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla Criminalità Organizza, Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata dell'Università 
degli Studi di Milano, Cross Vol.3 N°1. 
143 Ibid. 
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3.2.1. Criminal firms by regions 
 
The criminal firms analysed are established in all the Italian regions, with the exceptions of 
Valle d’Aosta, Marche and Molise. This is due not to the immunity of these regions to the mafia 
infiltrations (there is no one single region that is not interested by such phenomenon144), but to 
the fact that: 
- many police investigations are still opened, so the data are not available yet; 
- there are objective difficulties in conducting the investigations due to the ability of the 
criminal groups to hide themselves behind the mask of the legality and to the high 
degree of silence still in place among the population.145 
The control group has been constructed collecting data of firms established in the same 
geographical territory of the criminal ones, in the same period of time and that operate in the 
same business sector, according to the Ateco Code.  
As far as concerned the non-criminal firms of the Southern of Italy, the control group is 
constituted by all the firms established in Calabria whose financial statements have been 
deposited in the local Chamber of Commerce in the period 2007-2015, that corresponds to the 
timeframe used for the collection of data for the criminal firms located in the same area. 
The majority of the criminal firms observed are located in Lombardia, Lazio, Veneto, Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria, as reported in the Figures below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
144 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
145 Gratteri Gratteri N., Nicaso A., (2009), Fratelli di Sangue, Strade Blu. 
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Figure 3.1 (a) -  Criminal firms by regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 (b) -  Criminal firms by regions 
 
Region Firms Observations
Piemonte 87 344
Liguria 20 71
Lombardia 251 912
Triveneto 113 477
Emilia-Romagna 63 225
Toscana 28 117
Umbria 2 6
Marche 0 0
Lazio 109 517
Abruzzo 8 28
Campania 4 16
Puglia 8 17
Calabria 29 126
Sicilia 4 5
Sardegna 2 4
TOTAL 728 2865
Criminal firms
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3.2.2. Criminal firms by industry 
 
The Figures 3.2 (a) and (b) provide a list of the business sectors where the criminal firms are 
present the most. 
As it is possible to see, the criminal firms operate mainly in the building and construction 
industry, in the real estate activities (i.e. the activities related to the trade of houses, renting and 
intermediation between the constructor and the potential acquirer of the house, etc.) and 
wholesale and retail activities; all these sectors have in common a low level of specialization, 
a low degree of openness to foreign markets, the low level of  public regulations and the high 
presence of public resources and founding, in terms of public contracts and contract tenders for 
the realizations of public infrastructures.146 
Therefore, the data confirms the results of the analysis conducted by the Ministry of Interior to 
study the sectors where the mafia-type organizations are present and invest the most. 147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu).  
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
147 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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Figure 3.2 (a) – Criminal firms by sectors (Ateco Code) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code Description Observations
18 Printing and reproduction of recording media 10
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 13
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 35
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 20
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 14
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 32
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 81
41 Building construction 413
42 Civil engineering 12
43 Specialised construction activities 70
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 48
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 122
47 Retail trade, exceptfor motor vehicles and motorcycles 39
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 68
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 18
56 Restaurant and catering services 62
58 Publishing activities 17
64 Other financial services, except insurance and pension funding 40
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 14
68 Real estate activities 511
70 Business and management consulting services 100
71 Architecture and engineering activities 50
72 Scientific research and development 12
73 Advertising and market research 20
77 Rental and leasing activities 12
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities 17
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 55
92 Gambling and betting activities 24
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 35
96 Personal care services 25
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Figure 3.2 (b) – Criminal firms by sectors (Ateco Code) 
 
 
The figure 3.3 below represents a summary of all the firms analysed and the related 
observations, clustered on the base of the geographical area of establishment, distinguishing the 
criminal and the non-criminal ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 - Criminal and non-criminal firms by area 
 
 
 
 
 
AREA
NUMBER O F 
FIRMS
NUMBER O F 
O BSERVATIO NS
South 54 197
of which Calabria 29 126
Centre-North 673 2,668
Criminal firms 728 2,865
South 22,978 181,446
of which Calabria 22,978 181,446
Centre-North 145,184 1,078,122
Non-criminal firms 168,162 1,259,568
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3.2.3 Criminal firms by year period 
 
The data on the financial statements of the criminal firms collected refer to the period 2005 – 
2015 for those firms established in the Centre-North, and 2007 – 2015 for those in the South of 
Italy. 
The figure 3.4 provides a clustering of the criminal firms and related observations collected by 
years, dividing the criminal firms (left side) from the non-criminal ones (right side). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 – Criminal and non-criminal firms by year 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
The classification of the criminal firms by industry, by region and by year period is useful to 
isolate the differences existing between the heterogeneous economic and financial data 
registered for the companies observed. 
In the following sections will be reported some descriptive statistics of the sample of criminal 
firms used for the analysis, with a distinction of the differences existing between the 
characteristics of the criminal firms and those of the non-criminal ones (3.3.1); then, the 
analysis will be focused on the differences between the characteristics of the entities operating 
in the Centre-North infiltrated by the mafia organizations and those operating in the South 
(3.3.2), in order to verify whether or not there are significant changes on the modus operandi 
with subsequent impacts in the financial statements among the two parts of Italy. 
Year Firms Observations Firms Observations
2005 286 289 58,212 58,224
2006 75 310 13,227 67,259
2007 128 396 33,804 100,967
2008 102 450 18,118 128,943
2009 41 399 10,386 120,560
2010 40 355 9,779 137,786
2011 27 285 7,934 132,687
2012 14 213 4,546 107,507
2013 9 125 2,804 105,690
2014 4 28 946 131,772
2015 2 15 878 168,173
Total 728 2,865 160,634 1,259,568
Criminal firms Non-criminal firms
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3.3.1 Criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 – Total assets of criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
The figure 3.5 shows that the criminal firms analysed, without distinction between those 
operating in the North and those in the South, have, on average, a higher amount of capital 
invested than the non-criminal ones. This result is also confirmed by the median value, that, on 
the contrary to the mean, is not affected as much by extreme values far from the mean; even 
that value is significantly higher than the non-criminal ones, confirming the high amount of 
capital that the mafia organizations invest in the legal economy.  
In the table it has been shown the t-test: it has several applications, but for the purpose of this 
analysis it is used to provide further information on the significance of the mean values 
obtained.  
In particular, it can be used to test the null hypothesis according to which the means of two 
populations are equal.148 
In this case, the null hypothesis is that the mean values of the total assets are equal for both 
criminal companies and non-criminal companies. The analysis has shown that it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis with a 5% significance level and conclude that criminal companies, 
on average, hold more assets than comparable non-criminal companies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
148 Rice, J. A. (2003). Mathematical statistics and data analysis. Beijing: China machine press. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        859.30        12,225.96 1,783.93   95,519.54 8,728.04      15,723.88  
Non-Criminal 1,080,946 529.18        3,663.98   78.11        81,213.51 3,510.88      3,817.08    
1,083,811 
Difference in mean       = 8,561.98   
t = 5.63-          
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0000*** 
[95% Conf. Interval]
Total assets - € 000
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6 – Total revenues of criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
The figure 3.6 report the values of the total revenues of the companies analysed. It is possible 
to note that the criminal firms, on average, show better economic performances than the non-
criminal ones; this result is confirmed by the median, that is higher than the legal firms, although 
the difference is less pronounced; therefore, the criminal organizations not only invest a 
considerable amount of resources in the legal economy, but are also capable to generate 
consistent streams of revenues. 
As for the previous case, the analysis of the t-test conducted on the significance of the mean 
confirms the results obtained. Indeed, with a 5% significant level we can reject the null 
hypothesis of equality among the means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 – EBITDA of criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        356.33        6,372.59   756.14      40,479.81 4,889.96      7,885.21    
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 282.00        2,565.32   35.52        36,928.06 2,495.70      2,634.93    
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 3,807.27   
t = -5.10
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0000*** 
Total revenues - € 000
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        23.73          742.51      113.94      6,096.39   519.11         965.92       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 22.85          151.57      8.98          8,527.10   133.98         169.17       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 590.94      
t = -3.70
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0002*** 
EBITDA - € 000
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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The figure 3.7 represents the EBITDA (Earnings before interests, taxes, amortization and 
depreciation) of the firms in the sample. It possible to note that, on average, the criminal firms 
have higher operating margins than the non-criminal ones, even if, by looking at the median 
value, this difference is sensibly smaller; this is due to the characteristic of the median, less 
affected by the presence of outliers that increase sensibly the average value. 
Considering the difference between the high spread in the total revenues among the two groups 
and the spread observed in this configuration of operating income, it is possible to conclude 
that the criminal firms incur, on average, higher operating costs, showing a lower level of 
efficiency in their cost structure.  
A possible explanation can be reconducted to the phenomenon of the ML, according to which 
the criminal firms records in the income statement costs for services and raw materials that in 
reality do not occur, to prove the flow of money toward other entities, often controlled by 
figureheads, that issue false invoices to document the transaction, layering the capitals 
originated elsewhere.149 
The t-test performed on the significance on the mean allows to reject the null hypothesis with 
a less than 1% of significant level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 – Asset Turnover ratio of criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
The table 3.8 shows the asset-turnover ratio, an index widely used to measure the efficiency of 
the company's investments in generating streams of revenues. 
Although the higher dimensions, in terms of assets, and the higher bulk of revenues that the 
criminal firms are able to generate, the index shows that the criminal companies are, on average, 
less efficient than the others, and that the difference in means is statistically significant.  
                                                          
149 Financial Action Task Force (2006), Trade Based Money Laundering, Paris N.1.   
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.4980        0.8892      0.04          2.08          0.8131         0.9653       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.7923        1.1248      0.00          2.73          1.1192         1.1305       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 0.24-          
t = 4.62
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0000*** 
Assets Turnover ratio - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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The result seems to confirm the theory according to which the criminal firms, that have been 
established through the use of violent forms, are penalized by the presence of the same element 
inside the organization, that represents the source of internal tensions and conflicts that make 
difficult the management of the company itself, revealing the economic weakness of this form 
of entrepreneurship with respect to the legal one150. 
In addition, this output confirms that the objectives to which the criminal firms aim at are 
manifold, and the succeeding in the market is not the priority, albeit with some exceptions.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9 – Leverage of criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
The figure 3.9 shows the leverage of the firms observed: the leverage is a measure of the level 
of indebtedness of the companies with respect to the total sources of financing. From the data 
it is possible to observe that the criminal firms, on average, have higher leverage than the non-
criminal companies, and the result is confirmed even by looking at the median values. 
Therefore, the outcome seems to deny the assumption according to which the criminal 
companies use the equity as the main source of funding due to the availability of the proceeds 
from the management of the illegal activities; on the other side, the numbers lay the emphasis 
on the pervasiveness of the phenomenon in the economy: the criminal firms, indeed, in this way 
are potentially subtracting financial resources to the legal companies, especially in a context 
where these resources are limited151. 
                                                          
150 Fantò E. (1998), L’impresa mafiosa e la sua crisi, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Anno 39, No. 4, Doppia lealtà 
e doppio Stato nella storia della Repubblica (Oct. - Dec., 1998), pp. 1095. 
151 Parbonetti A., Fabrizi M., Malaspina P., (2017), Caratteristiche e Modalità di Gestione delle Aziende Criminali, 
Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla Criminalità Organizza, Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata dell'Università 
degli Studi di Milano, Cross Vol.3 N°1. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.8381        0.8251      0.01          0.65          0.8002         0.8501       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.7583        0.7315      0.00          0.61          0.7302         0.7326       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 0.09          
t = -7.88
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0000*** 
Leverage - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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The t-test performed allows to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the means and conclude 
that criminal companies, on average, have higher level of indebtedness than comparable non-
criminal companies. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10 – Cost of debt for criminal and non-criminal firms 
 
After the analysis on the leverage, the focus is on the cost of the debt; at first sight, as shown in 
the figure 3.8, the criminal companies, on average, pay a lower rate on the sources of funding 
borrowed from outside, and this data is confirmed even by the median value. However, there is 
no statistical significance to reject the null hypothesis of the t-test, therefore it is not possible to 
conclude that the criminal companies pay less financial interests than non-criminal firms. 
 
3.3.1 Criminal firms in the Centre-North and criminal firms in the South 
 
While in the previous paragraph it has been conducted a description of the characteristics of the 
sample of criminal and non-criminal firms, pointing out the main differences between the two 
groups, in this section will be reported the same dimensions to verify the existence or not of 
significative differences between the criminal firms operating in the Centre-North of Italy and 
those operating in the Southern of the Country.  
The aim is to verify whether the criminal organizations adopt different strategies based on the 
place of establishment, considering their characteristic of flexible organizational structure and 
perfect adaptation to the local economic context, especially as far as concerned the ‘Ndrangheta. 
 
 
 
 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,588        0.0126        0.0592      0.02          1.06          0.0182         0.1000       
Non-Criminal 984           0.0139        0.0932      0.00          2.94          0.0900         0.0990       
1,604        
Difference in mean       = 0.03-          
t = 0.59
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.5540
Cost of debt - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 3.11 – Total assets of criminal firms by area 
 
The figure 3.11 shows the dimension, in terms of total assets, of the criminal firms in the Centre-
North with respect to those in the Southern of Italy.  
On average, the formers have a larger size with respect to the latter; however, the result of the 
t-test performed does not allow to reject the null hypothesis according to which the two means 
are equal for the two groups of companies, since the P ( |T| > |t| ) is not lower than the threshold 
of the 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.12 – Total revenues of criminal firms by area 
 
From the table 3.12 it is possible to note similar considerations made for the total capital 
invested: indeed, although the criminal firms operating in the Centre-North show, on average, 
better economic performances in terms of revenues generated, the difference between the two 
means are not sufficiently significative to reject the null hypothesis. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           881.57        12,538.20 1,908.14   98,615.92 8,796.62      16,279.78  
South 2,668        649.48        7,970.87   2,167.18   30,340.53 3,696.75      12,244.99  
2,865        
Difference in mean       = 4,567.33   
t = 0.65-          
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.5183
Total assets - € 000
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           268.09        6,085.69   746.18      38,563.77 4,622.54      7,548.83    
South 2,668        182.37        2,094.28   341.20      4,764.64   1,421.34      2,767.23    
2,865        
Difference in mean       = 3,991.41   
t = -1.44
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.1488
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Total revenues - € 000
[95% Conf. Interval]
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However, from the observation of the median, it is possible to note how the sample analysed 
differ both in terms of capital invested and revenues: in the South of Italy the amount of 
resources managed by the criminal organizations and represented in the financial statement are 
smaller than those moved in the Centre-North of the Country.  
Similar considerations can be made for the EBITDA of the two groups observed.  
On one side, the median value of the frequency distribution of the EBITDA capture that 
difference, that can be explained, as for the difference between criminal and non-criminal firms, 
by the lower efficiency of the criminal firms in the South.  
On the one side, however, there is no statistical significance to state that the two means are 
different and to reject the null hypothesis: therefore, it is not possible to state with an acceptable 
significance level that the criminal companies operating in the Centre-North have higher 
operating margins with respect to those in the South. This is confirmed by the EBITDA margin 
(i.e. the ratio between the EBITDA and the total revenues) that is lower for the firms operating 
in the Centre-North of Italy (median values: 6.37% for firms in the Centre-North; 9.09% for 
those in the South). 
The table 3.13 summarizes the considerations made for the EBITDA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Table 3.13 – EBITDA of criminal firms by area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           23.99          755.98      121.18      6,259.04   518.37         993.59       
South 2,668        18.25          558.21      222.96      3,113.51   118.47         997.95       
2,865        
Difference in mean       = 197.77      
t = -0.44
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.6620
EBITDA - € 000
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 3.14 – Asset Turnover ratio of criminal firms by area 
 
The table 3.14 reports the asset turnover ratio observed for the two groups: the p-test does not 
allow to reject the hypothesis of equality of the two means, but the median values are indicative 
of the lower efficiency of the criminal firms operating the South. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.15 – Leverage of criminal firms by area 
 
As far as concerned the structure of the sources of funding, the table 3.15 provides useful 
insights: indeed, although the t-test performed highlights that there is not sufficient significance 
to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between means, the median value of the 
distribution observed shows that the criminal firms operating in the South of Italy have more 
equity than those in the Centre-North, albeit the majority of the funds raised come from the 
indebtedness.  
A possible explanation is that the mafia organizations, that in the South are longer established 
and where are more radicalized in the economic fabric, decide to adopt a different modus 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           0.5155        0.9035      0.04          2.12          0.8226         0.9843       
South 2,668        0.3421        0.6926      0.08          1.09          0.5384         0.8469       
2,865        
Difference in mean       = 0.21          
t = -1.36
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.1731
Assets Turnover ratio - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           0.8440        1.6224      0.23          11.42        1.1682         2.0765       
South 2,668        0.7535        0.7989      0.06          0.78          0.6883         0.9095       
2,865        
Difference in mean       = 0.82          
t = -1.00
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.3165
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Leverage - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
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operandi with respect to the one used in the Centre-North. Although the phenomenon of the 
money laundering of the proceeds of their illegal activities is widespread across the whole 
Country, in the South it is more evident 152.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.16 – Cost of indebtedness for criminal firms by area 
 
The table 3.16 shows the cost of debt for the two groups. It is possible to observe that here the 
t-test performed on the difference between the two means allows to reject the null hypothesis 
with a 1% significance level and conclude that criminal companies established in the Centre-
North of Italy pay, on average, lower cost on the debt than those established in the South of 
Italy. 
The economic implications are particularly important if we consider that the median of the cost 
of debt of the non-criminal firms established in the Southern Italy is around the 10.53%, while 
the rate paid by the criminal companies in the same area is much lower, as shown in the above 
table.  
Thus, the criminal firms not only can use the huge amount of resources coming from the illegal 
activities, but, by using mostly sources in the form of debt, subtract further resources to the 
legal economy, especially considering a situation in which it is more difficult and costly to 
borrow sources of financing. 
                                                          
152 Savona E. U., Riccardi M., (eds), (2017), Assessing the risk of money laundering in Europe. Final Report of 
Project IARM (www.transcrime.it/iarm). Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Centre-North 197           0.0131        0.0226      0.00          0.04          0.0209         0.0242       
South 2,391        0.0076        0.0148      0.00          0.02          0.0116         0.0179       
2,588        
Difference in mean       = 0.0078      
t = -2.67
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0077*** 
Cost of debt - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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In addition, the much lower cost can be interpreted as a flag of the phenomenon of corruption 
that interests the public and financial institutions, many times infiltrated by the mafia 
organizations or colluded with them153. 
 
To sum up, in general terms the criminal firms observed are larger and generate higher bulks 
of revenues than the non-criminal ones, and this phenomenon is particularly evident in the 
Northern of Italy. However, the criminal companies are more inefficient, as shown by the lower 
value of the asset turnover ratio, as well as by higher incidence of the operating costs on the 
revenues generated, observed both in the Centre-North and in the South of the Country. 
By looking at the funds used to finance the investments, it is notable the prevalence of the 
recourse to the indebtedness, and the phenomenon is particularly evident in the North, where 
the incidence of the debt on the total sources of funding is higher than the 84%.  
In the South, instead, considering both the lower dimensions of the firms observed and the 
higher incidence of equity, it is possible to infer that the phenomenon of the money laundering, 
that is present the most in these regions (Calabria, Sicilia and Campania)154, is used through the 
constitution of many front business activities, as bars, restaurants and hotels, where the cash 
intensiveness of the industry and the facility to mix the legal with illegal proceeds in this kind 
of activities allow to better avoid the controls of the judicial authorities. 
 
3.4 Statistical analysis  
 
After the description of the criminal firms presented in the previous paragraph, in this section 
it will be presented the analysis performed to verify the existence of the competitive advantages 
of the criminal firms in the markets where they operate. 
As far as concerned the first competitive advantage, it is materially difficult to verify the 
discouragement of the market concurrence undertaken by the criminal firms with the data 
available, because of the nature of the phenomenon and due to the fact that these actions do not 
find a representation in the financial statements. 
However, according to this dissertation it is fundamental the comprehension of the importance 
of the discouragement of the concurrence to understand the modus operandi of the criminal 
firms, and more in general of the mafia organizations which ultimately control them. 
                                                          
153 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
154 Savona E. U., Riccardi M., (eds), (2017), Assessing the risk of money laundering in Europe. Final Report of 
Project IARM (www.transcrime.it/iarm). Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
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For this reason, the analysis that will be shown are focused on the testing of the other two 
competitive advantages theorized: 
I) the wage compression, thus the expected lower incidence of the cost of labour, 
intended as the sum of all its components, on the total revenues reported in the 
income statement; 
II) the higher availability of financial resources, intended as the expected higher 
incidence of the cash and cash equivalents on the total assets of the firm, as reported 
in the balance sheet. 
The analysis will be performed with the use of a statistic technique: the multivariate linear 
regression (MLR). 
Multivariate linear regression (MLR) is a statistical technique that uses several explanatory 
variables to predict the outcome of a set of response variables. The objective of multivariate 
linear regression is to model the relationship between the explanatory and response variables. 
In the following paragraphs it will be presented the results of the analysis.  
 
3.4.1 Preliminary considerations 
 
The first step is a preliminary analysis of the items to be tested, performed with the use of a the 
very basic statistics tools, as the mean, median and standard deviation of the distribution, in 
order to provide some first considerations. Moreover, it will be performed a t-test to verify the 
significance of the difference in means between the criminal firms and the control group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.17 – Incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues for criminal and non-criminal firms  
 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.0709        8.1314      5.43          268.59      2.5093-         18.7722     
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.0747        5.7336      0.44          399.55      4.8758         6.5900       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 2.40-          
t = -0.30
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.7666
Personnel cost / Total revenues - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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As shown in the table 3.17, the criminal firms shown, on average, an higher incidence of the 
cost of personnel on the total revenues than the non-criminal ones. However: 
- the t-test conducted on the difference between the two means is not significative, thus it 
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of equality among the two means with a 
sufficient level of significance; 
- the median value, not affected by the presence of some outliers, provides a different 
scenario, in which the incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues is lower for 
the criminal firms than the control group.  
For this reason, it is useful to winsorise the variable for the 1% and check whether the results 
found are mainly due to the presence of outliers. 
Winsorization is a method of averaging that initially replaces the smallest and largest values 
with the observations closest to them. This is done to limit the effect of abnormal extreme 
values, or outliers, on the calculation155. The advantage of the use of the winsorization is that it 
can lead to a considerable increase of the efficiency of estimators and tests.156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.18 – Incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues for criminal and non-criminal firms, 
after winsorization 
 
The table 3.18 shows that the incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues, after the 
winsorization. However, some considertions are needed: 
- the mean values observed after winsorization are far from the values observed in the 
previous table, demonstrating the presence of few outliers that impacted on the 
distribution; 
                                                          
155 https://www.investopedia.com. 
Ruppert, D. (2004). Trimming and winsorization. Encyclopedia of statistical sciences, 14. 
156 Ibid. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.0709        0.1667      0.00          0.24          0.1573         0.1762       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.0747        0.1640      0.00          0.26          0.1632         0.1643       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 0.0027-      
t = -0.01
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.5660
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Personnel cost / Total revenues - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
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- after the winsorization the mean value is much closer to the median one, albeit showing 
a slightly different outcome: indeed, by looking at the means, it is notable that, on 
average, the criminal firms have a higher incidence of the cost of labour on their 
turnover; 
- the t-test performed, however, does not provide a good significance level to reject the 
null hypothesis of equality among the two means. 
Therefore, according to the results of this preliminary analysis, it is not possible to state that the 
criminal firms have higher or lower incidence of the cost of labour on the total revenues than 
the non-criminal ones, albeit the distribution of the sample shows that the second case is more 
frequent than the first. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.19 – Incidence of the liquidity on the total assets for criminal and non-criminal firms  
 
As far as concerned the incidence of the liquidity on the total assets, it is possible to observe 
that, at first sight, the criminal firms have a lower incidence than the non-criminal ones. 
Moreover, the t-test performed shows that the result is significant at 1% level, so it is possible 
to reject the null hypothesis of equality among the two means.  
By looking at the median, the result has similar outcomes, thus it is not influenced by the 
presence of outliers. 
However, for sake of consistency157, below are presented the results obtained after the 
winsorization of the variable for the 1%. 
 
 
  
                                                          
157 Ruppert, D. (2004). Trimming and winsorization. Encyclopedia of statistical sciences, 14. 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.0222        0.1048      0.00          0.22          0.0968         0.1127       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.0395        0.7424      0.01          11.29        0.7191         0.7657       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 0.64          
t = 3.02
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0025*** 
Liquidity / Total assets - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 3.20 – Incidence of the liquidity on the total assets for criminal and non-criminal firms, after 
winsorization 
 
As it is possible to observe, the results are quite similar to the ones obtained after the 
winsorization, confirming that, on average, the criminal firms have a lower amount of cash and 
cash equivalent in their balance sheet than the control group.  
 
However, the results obtained consider only the relation between the dependent variables (i.e. 
Incidence of personnel cost on total revenues and the incidence of the liquidity on the total 
assets) and the dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm is a criminal one, but they 
do not provide any indication on the effect that the affiliation to a mafia organization has with 
respect to the dependent variables to analyse. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a model that takes into account other factors that may have 
an impact on the values taken either by the dependent variable or the independent variables.  
The following list reports the control variables that will be used in the multivariate regression 
analysis. 
▪ SIZE_w: the first control variable represents the size of the firm analysed and it is 
expressed in terms of the logarithm of the total assets: it is expected to have an influence 
both on the choices related to the management of the liquidity and on those related to 
the workforce to employ in the organization; 
▪ ROE_w: the second control variable is the ROE (i.e. return on equity), a measure of the 
financial performance calculated by dividing the net income by the shareholder’s equity, 
that is expected to positively influence the liquidity of the firm; 
▪ LEVERAGE_w: this third control variable represents the rate of indebtedness over the 
total assets; it is expected to positively influence the incidence of the cost of personnel 
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Criminal 2,865        0.0222        0.1082      0.00          0.20          0.1007         0.1157       
Non-Criminal 1,080,751 0.0395        0.1309      0.00          0.21          0.1305         0.1313       
1,083,616 
Difference in mean       = 0.0038      
t = 5.89
P ( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0000*** 
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Liquidity / Total assets - %
[95% Conf. Interval]
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when the level reaches a very high value, as is for the criminal firms, due to the burden 
of debt that can lead to worse the economic performances expressed by the total 
revenues. 
▪ NETSALES_w: the last control variable represents the net sales of the company: better 
economic performances should lower the incidence of the cost of labour on the total 
revenues and increase the level of liquidity. 
 
The control variables listed, that are used in the multivariate regression model, are described in 
the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.18 – Control variables used in the multivariate analysis 
 
In order to understand the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables of the 
model, it is possible to use a correlation matrix.  
It is a table showing correlation coefficients between sets of variables, other than the 
significance of the correlation, expressed by a star (*).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.19 – Control variables used in the multivariate analysis 
 
From the correlation matrix it is possible to note that: 
- the dummy variable “Criminal” is negatively and significantly correlated with the 
incidence of the liquidity on the total assets (CASH_ASSETS_w) and positively, 
Variable Observations Mean St. Deviation Percentile_25 Percentile_50 Percentile_75
SIZE_w 1,080,616 3,686.63 81,255.81 171.28 529.81 1,665.00
ROE_w 1,080,616 0.4731 361.3100 -0.0454 0.0364 0.2069
LEVERAGE_w 1,080,616 9.4835 1161.5000 0.4687 0.7481 0.9147
NETSALES_w 1,080,616 2,455.99 35,282.08 37.76 247.48 927.79
INC_LABOUR_w CASH_ASSETS_w CRIMINAL SIZE_w ROE_w LEVERAGE_w NETSALES_w
INC_LABOUR_w
1.0000
CASH_ASSETS_w
0.1583* 1.0000
CRIMINAL 
0.0006 -0.0062* 1.0000
SIZE_w -0.1188* -0.3679* 0.0151* 1.0000
ROE_w 0.0094* 0.0506* 0.0012 -0.0202* 1.0000
LEVERAGE_w 0.2335* 0.2703* -0.0018 -0.3142* 0.0378* 1.0000
NETSALES_w -0.0171* -0.1283* 0.0166* 0.6412* 0.0161* -0.1260* 1.0000
* p < 0.5
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although not significantly, correlated with the incidence of the personnel cost on the 
total revenues; in addition, it is significantly and positively correlated with the total 
assets (SIZE_w) and the total revenues (NETSALES_w) and even  with the ROE 
(ROE_w), while is negatively correlated with the leverage, albeit not significantly; 
- the incidence of labour is significantly and positively correlated with the liquidity 
managed by the firm (CASH_ASSETS_w), with the profitability of the firm (ROE_w) 
and  with the level of indebtedness (LEVERAGE_w); on the other side it is negatively 
and significantly correlated with the net sales (NETSALES_w) and with the total capital 
invested (SIZE_w); 
- the incidence of liquidity over the total assets is positively and significantly correlated 
with the level of profitability (ROE_w) and with the level of indebtedness of the firm 
(LEVERAGE_w), while is negatively and significantly correlated with the capital 
invested (SIZE_w) and with the operating turnover of the firms (NETSALES_w). 
  
3.4.2 Analysis on the competitive advantages 
 
3.4.2.1 Wage compression 
 
The first multivariate regression performed is to test whether in the criminal firms there is a 
higher incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues with respect to the non-criminal 
firms. 
In the light of the considerations made, the model used to examine the determinants of the 
incidence of the labour cost on the total revenues is: 
 
INC_LABOUR i,t  =  ẞ0 + ẞ1  CRIMINAL i,t + ẞ2 SIZE_w I,t   + ẞ3 ROE_w i,t +   
                                        ẞ4 LEVERAGE_w i,t  + ẞ5 NETSALES_w i,t  + ɛ i,t 
 
In the equation are included year fixed effects and are clustered robust standard errors by firm 
to correct for serial dipendence158, due to the fact that the model uses observations that are 
clustered into companies (identified through their ID159) observed for consequent periods.  
                                                          
158 Petersen, M. A. (2009) Estimating standard errors in Finance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Review 
of financial studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Bianchi Pietro A., Marra A., Masciandaro D., Pecchiari N., (2017), “Is It Worth Having the Sopranos on Board? 
Corporate Governance Pollution and Organized Crime: the Case of Italy”, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2017-59. 
159 Identification code is the “Codice Fiscale – CF”. 
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Therefore, in the first column (1) are presented the results of the regression performed using 
the robust option, while in the second column (2) the analysis is adjusted considering even the 
serial dependence of the observations, thus clustering the data into the 168,890 firms present in 
the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.20 – Linear regression on the incidence of the personnel cost on the total revenues   
 
As it is possible to observe, in the first column it has been used the robust option, and the 
regression suggest that there is a positive effect on the incidence of the cost of labour on the 
total revenues due to the affiliation of the firm to a mafia organization: the result is statistically 
significant at less than 1% level. 
INC_LABOUR
(1)
INC_LABOUR
(2)
0.025 0.025
0.000*** 0.006***
0.0158 0.0158
0.000*** 0.000***
-0.0017 -0.0017
0.000*** 0.007
0.0211 0.0211
0.000*** 0.000***
0.0053 0.0053
0.000*** 0.000***
0.2221 0.2221
0.000*** 0.000***
Observations 1,083,616 1,083,616
R-squared 0.087 0.087
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Robust option Yes Yes
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
CRIMINAL
SIZE_w
ROE_w
LEVERAGE_w
NETSALES_w
INTERCEPT
Time fixed effect
Cluster option
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By looking at the second column, where it has been applied the cluster option160, the results are 
very similar to the ones already found, with a slight lower level of significance, albeit under the 
1% level. 
Therefore, the analysis conducted does not confirm the hypothesis according to which the 
criminal firms pay, on average, a lower cost for personnel, including the salaries, the social and 
security contributions and the severance payments, in relation to the total revenues.    
 
3.4.2.2 Availability of financial resources 
 
The second multivariate regression performed is to test whether there is a positive relation 
between the liquidity hold by a company and the infiltration of a mafia organization in the 
company itself. 
The model used to examine the determinants of the incidence of the liquidity, expressed in 
terms of cash and cash equivalents, on the total revenues is the following: 
 
CASH_ASSETS i,t  =  ẞ0 + ẞ1  CRIMINAL i,t + ẞ2 SIZE_w I,t   + ẞ3 ROE_w i,t +   
                                        ẞ4 LEVERAGE_w i,t  + ẞ5 NETSALES_w i,t  + ɛ i,t 
 
The test variable (CRIMINAL) and all the controls are the same of those in the equation of the 
incidence of the cost of labour on total revenues.  
As for the other test, also in this case are presented two columns: the first in which it has been 
used the robust option, and the second where it has been applied the cluster option, considering 
that many observations are related to same firms observed for many years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
160 The robust option is implicitly included in the cluster option. See Petersen, M. A. (2009) Estimating standard 
errors in Finance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Review of financial studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
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Table 3.21 – Linear regression on the incidence of the liquidity on the total assets   
 
The results highlight a significant negative coefficient on CRIMINAL (p-value < 0.01), which 
provides evidence that firms controlled by a mafia organization show lower levels of liquidity, 
in terms of incidence over the total assets, than non-criminal firms. 
This is confirmed by looking at both the first and second column, demonstrating that, even 
adjusting the analysis by considering the serial dependence of the observations, the results are 
extremely similar, with a higher level of statistical significance in both cases.  
Moreover, by looking at the control variables, it is possible to note that all of them are 
statistically significant in the regression, in both the first with the robust option and in the 
second, with the cluster option.  
 
CASH_ASSETS
(1)
CASH_ASSETS
(2)
-0.0188 -0.0188
0.000*** 0.000***
-0.0639 -0.0639
0.000*** 0.000***
0.007 0.007
0.000*** 0.000***
0.0171 0.0171
0.000*** 0.000***
0.0148 0.0148
0.000*** 0.000***
0.321 0.321
0.000*** 0.000***
Observations 1,083,616 1,083,616
R-squared 0.2478 0.2478
* p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Time fixed effect Yes Yes
Robust option Yes Yes
Cluster option No Yes
CRIMINAL
SIZE_w
ROE_w
LEVERAGE_w
NETSALES_w
INTERCEPT
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3.5 Results and implications 
 
The aim of the research performed in the last paragraph was to test the existence or not of two 
of the competitive advantages that the criminal firms are expected to have with respect to the 
other companies, as theorized and discussed by the scientific literature: the wage compression 
and the availability of a higher amount of financial resources, in terms of cash and cash 
equivalents. 
However, from the results of the regressions performed, it is possible to note that the infiltration 
of the mafia organizations in the legal economy leads the firms controlled to have a higher 
incidence of the cost of personnel over the total revenues and to hold less liquidity, relatively 
to the amount of total assets, than the other companies operating in the same areas; moreover, 
the results are statistically significant both using the cluster option (i.e. considering that many 
observations relate to the same firm observed through a period of time) or not, with a p-value 
lower than the 1% significance level. 
 
The results obtained through the performance of the multivariate analysis seems to be against 
the main strand of research, according to which the criminal firms, on average, pay lower costs 
in terms of salaries, social and security contributions and severance indemnities, and hold 
higher amount of liquidity than the comparable non-criminal companies.  
Nonetheless, they represent a very interesting starting point for some qualitative considerations: 
1. As far as concerned the first analysis, conducted on the incidence of the personnel cost 
over the total revenues, it is important to remind that the criminal firms are mainly used 
for ML purposes by the mafia organizations, as explained in the second chapter: the 
payment of salaries can fraudulently be done to figureheads or affiliates of the same 
mafia organization, or even to make appear a provision of a specific service in order to 
elude a specific rule, or even for a large-scale organized benefit fraud161. As far as 
concerned this last case, an important example is the one that regards a private company 
established in Sweden, where the firms providing care assistance for disabled persons 
receives approximately € 30 per hour of work, that should then be turned to the 
employees; this company has built a fraudulent and criminal scheme according to which 
it reported to the public Social Insurance Agency (the equivalent of the Italian INPS) a 
                                                          
161 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu).  
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
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certain amount of hours worked by the employees, that in reality have never been 
worked. The salaries were paid to consent employees that returned the money back to 
the owners of the infiltrated company162.  
Another explanation for the higher incidence of the cost of labour can be found on the 
willingness to increase the salaries paid to the employees to maximize the salary 
guarantees when the firm is close to the bankruptcy163: this strategy is particularly 
efficient because the money paid will be turned back to the organizations from the 
colluded workforce, most of the time affiliated as well.  
Therefore, besides the classical view, shared by many authors164, of the existence of the 
wage compression, there are many other views that instead offer a different perspective.  
Another consideration regards the fact that many of the revenues reported in the 
financial statement are not always related to real provisions of good and services: 
according to Catanzaro, indeed, many criminal firms, established as shell or paper 
companies, are characterized by the lack of or minimum productive activities165. At the 
accounting level, this can be reflected into a higher incidence of the personnel cost on 
the total revenues.   
2. Even the second result of the analysis performed shows a different outcome than the 
one expected: indeed, it has been found that the criminal firms hold less liquidity, 
expressed in terms of cash and cash equivalents, than the non-criminal ones. Also in this 
case, however, there are many possible explanations: the first is linked with the money 
laundering phenomenon, according to which the criminal organizations use the legal 
economy as instrumental for the concealment of the illicit profits obtained from the 
illegal activities managed: in this case, however, only a small portion remains as liquid 
cash uninvested, and most importantly only a fraction is reported in the financial 
statement166: most of the times the funds are transferred abroad, through figureheads, 
                                                          
162 Ibid. 
163 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu).  
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento, p. 110. 
164 Arlacchi P., (2007), La Mafia Imprenditrice: dalla Calabria al Centro dell’Inferno, Il Saggiatore. 
Catanzaro R. (1988), Il delitto come impresa. Storia sociale della mafia, Liviana Editrice, Padova. 
Fantò E. (1999), L’impresa a partecipazione mafiosa: economia legale ed economia criminale, Dedalo editore. 
165 Catanzaro R. (1988), Il delitto come impresa. Storia sociale della mafia, Liviana Editrice, Padova. 
166 Financial Action Task Force (2006), Trade Based Money Laundering, Paris N.1. 
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often on “tax heavens”, by using “smurfs” or other structuring transactions167; many 
other times, instead, are moved through many and repetitive transactions, to other 
infiltrated companies. The second reason may lie behind the willingness to lower the 
risk of detection: in this case the criminal firms prefer to hide the most their financial 
resources, and to disinvest the assets that can be subjected to seizure by the public 
authorities, as reported by Savona in its report168, demonstrating also the efficacy of the 
measures that include the use of the seizure. A third motivation can be found on the 
characteristics of the sectors were the rate of infiltration by the mafia organizations is 
very high, as the front office businesses (bars, hotels, restaurants, etc…), characterized 
by a very high level of cash intensiveness and by lower and more difficult controls by 
the authorities. In there, the criminal firms move high quantities of cash without needing 
to display them in the financial statement because they circulate in the underground 
economy.169 
In the lights of these considerations, it is important to point out the need of further researches. 
The combination of quantitative data and qualitative information may represent a turning point 
in the fight against criminal organisations, against the money laundering and against the 
distortions that the presence of the criminal firms lead to the market and to the economy as a 
whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167Schneider S, (2004) Money laundering in Canada: a quantitative analysis of Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
cases, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 11 Issue: 3, pp.282-291. 
168 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu).  
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
169 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The mafia organizations, unfortunately, have a secular relationship with the Italian history. 
Starting from the regions located in the South of Italy, today there is no a single area that can 
be considered as immune to the phenomenon of the mafia infiltrations, with the exception of 
the Garda Lake170. The reasons behind this transplantation to the north are manifold: on the one 
side, the capacity of adaptation of the organizations, especially the ‘Ndrangheta, that is 
particularly able to penetrate in new and different societies and to hide the illegal activities 
performed behind apparently legal actions; on the other side, however, there is a mix of cultural, 
social, political and economic factors that encourage the creation of the so-called “grey area”, 
external to the mafia itself and to the society, but that represents the meeting point of the 
interests of the two counterparts, as confirmed by the annual report of the Italian Antimafia 
Parliamentary Commission. 
The mafia groups have entered, to all the intents, the legal economy, driven by profitable 
opportunities as well as by other factors, such as the willingness to exercise the control of 
territory and to gain a social consensus among the population. 
Last but not least, the criminal organizations use the investments in the legal economy to 
conceal the funds illicitly gained from the undertaking of the illegal activities, whose returns 
still represent the principal source of financing.  
The money laundering, therefore, is one of the key elements that steers the strategies of the 
criminal firms, the link between the black and white economy, as theorized by Sciarrone; in 
this scenario, the criminal firm is the instrument through which this conjunction is realized. 
Thus, understanding its functioning and structure is fundamental to have a clearer idea on the 
modus operandi of the mafia organizations, or at least part of it. 
In the light of these considerations, the objectives of the dissertation are twofold: on one side, 
it aims at providing a framework for the analysis of the characteristics of the criminal firms and 
the elements of differentiation with respect to the other companies operating in the Italian 
territory, both those established in the South of Italy, where the phenomenon of the mafia 
association moved its first steps, and those in the Centre and North of the Country, where, 
especially in the recent decades, the mafia organizations have reserved a particular interest.171 
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On the other side, it aims at demonstrating the existence of the competitive advantages most 
commonly attributed to the criminal firms and discussed in the scientific literature: 
1) the discouragement of the concurrence; 
2) the wage compression; 
3) the availability of financial resources. 
Although the first competitive advantage is fundamental to understand the modus operandi of 
the mafia organizations and that, through the use of the violence, represents the key distinctive 
element of the old “metodo mafioso”172, the nature through which it is manifested is not suitable 
with an empirical analysis performed on the financial data of the companies. For this reason, 
for the sake of this dissertation have been considered the other two advantages, the wage 
compression and the availability of financial resources. 
In detail, the data used for the analysis are the economic and financial information recorded in 
the financial statements of the firms that resulted by the police investigations and judged by an 
Italian Court for their affiliation to a mafia organization, according to the Art. 416-bis of the 
Italian Penal Code (the so-called “legge Rognoni – La Torre”). 
The results of the analysis show that the criminal firms are, on average, larger, with higher 
revenues and higher level of indebtedness than the non-criminal ones; moreover, in spite of the 
lower efficiency, measured in terms of asset turnover ratio, these companies can raise high 
quantities of debt at lower costs than the ones incurred by the other firms. In addition, by looking 
at the differences between the indicators observed for the criminal firms established in the 
Centre-North of Italy with those in the South, it is possible to note that all the characteristics 
founded are more pronounced in the formers than in the latter group.  
Then, the last part of the third chapter has been dedicated to the testing of the hypothesis 
concerning the existence of the two competitive advantages, namely the incidence of the cost 
of perssonel over the total revenues, expected to be lower than the other firms, and the amount 
of liquidity over the total assets, expected to be higher than the control group. 
The results have shown a scenario that provides useful insights on the phenomenon; although  
neither the first nor the second hypothesis have been verified by the multivariate regressions 
(whose results are statistically significant at 1% level), it is possible to provide a plausible 
explanation to the data using more recent case studies conducted by a pilot European project 
that has analysed cases of infiltrations by the criminal organizations in the legitimate 
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businesses173; moreover, another study performed by the Universtià Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 
di Milano in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of Interior174,  despite the theoretical 
acceptance of the existence of the competitive advantages, has shown applicative exceptions to 
the assertions, highlighting that, from the analysis of the financial statements, it does not always 
result the wage compression and the higher availability of financial resources.   
Therefore, the higher incidence of the cost of labour on the total revenues can be justified by a 
deliberate strategy, decided by the criminal organizations, to use these costs for money 
laundering purposes, showing in the income statement a cost that is incurred only formally, but 
that on the substance does not lead to a monetary esbourse to the employees, as happens for the 
legal firms. 
On the other side, the lower liquidity shown in the balance sheet is not a signal of liquidity 
problems of the criminal companies, but instead it is the proof of the existence of a series of 
incentives that the management has to hide, to conceal, to move or simply to invest elsewhere 
the funds obtained from the illegal channels.  
 
One of the main limitation implicit to this work, and more in general to the works performed 
through similar modalities, is the reliability of the data included in the financial statements, that 
are often subjected to manipulations.  
In addition, for further researches it is suggested to use more qualitative data that can provide 
useful information as, for example, the percentage of partecipation in other companies that does 
imply a control stake, especially if the participated companies have other equity investments 
abroad, forming a sort of “chinese box”; moreover, the name, the nationality, as well as number 
of crimes committed by the owners of these firms; a distinction between firms participated by 
the mafia organizations and firms established (or acquired) from zero by the criminal group, to 
see what are the differences between these two types of criminal companies, etc… 
Another guidance for new studies can be related to the statistical technique used for the analysis. 
One of the main downsides of the multivariate regression is related to the problem of 
endogeneity; in the MLR, indeed, the estimates of the dependent variable are not sufficiently 
adjusted for the independent variables whether the relation between the two is mis-specified175. 
                                                          
173 Savona E. U., Berlusconi G., (2015). Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot 
Project in Five European Countries, Final Report of Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of 
Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu).  
Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 
174 Transcrime, (2013), Progetto PON Sicurezza 2007-2013: Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rapporto Linea 1. 
Milano: Ministero dell’Interno, www.investimentioc.it. 
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This issue is a specific kind of endogeneity called functional form misspecification: the effects 
of the proper functional form are limited to the error term and are correlated with the treatment, 
biasing the estimator. One way to alleviate this bias is the use of the propensity score 
matching176, that consists on a building of a control group composed not by the whole 
population of non-criminal firms, but of a part of it, based on the highest probability assigned 
to each observation (p-score) to be matched with the observations subject to the treatment (in 
this case, the firms infiltrated by the mafia group). 
Then, the PSM calculate the difference between the mean values observed for the matched 
observations and those calculated for the unmatched ones, to arrive at the conclusion on whether 
the treatment has a causal relation with the dependent variable to study. 
However, the implementation of this model requires a particular attention on the selection of 
the proper variables to use for the analysis and on the particular design choices to undertake, 
and not always the results obtained are better, or more precise, then those obtained by using the 
multivariate analysis177 as adopted for the sake of this dissertation. 
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